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ABSTRACT
States continue to abuse human rights and commit mass
atrocities even though for the past several decades they have
overwhelmingly ratified a host of international human rights
treaties. This Article seeks to explain this phenomenon and
suggests that where treaty enforcement mechanisms are too weak
for states to view them as a credible threat to their sovereignty,
even states with the worst practices will regularly and readily
commit to treaties designed to promote better human rights
practices. I empirically test my credible threat theory against the
explanatory power of other extant theories about treaty
commitment by examining the relationship between treaty
enforcement mechanisms and likelihood of ratification across a
broad range of treaties. I include in my analysis the treaty creating
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—a treaty which contains
a strong enforcement mechanism in the form of an independent
Prosecutor and the Court, which can punish violators.
The results of the statistical tests using data from 1966 to 2008
provide support for the credible threat theory. I find that a state’s
human rights ratings do not influence ratification of international
human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms,
such as those that only require the state to self-report its
compliance. However, states with poorer records are significantly
less likely to commit to the ICC treaty. The implication is that
where enforcement mechanisms are strong, states may take their
commitment more seriously and join only if they intend to comply.
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If we structure treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms,
perhaps fewer states will ratify, but at least when they do, they
may be held to that commitment.
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INTRODUCTION

Motivated by the destruction caused by World War II, the
international community created a human rights regime designed
to protect the basic human rights of all individuals.1 The
international treaties at the foundation of this regime are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”), both of which were opened for signature and
ratification in 1966 and came into force in 1976.2 Additional
international human rights treaties followed, and the regime now
boasts six primary treaties, to which the great majority of states
belong.3 Table 1 below lists the six main international human
rights treaties.

1 See YOUCEF BOUANDEL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 1 (1997)
(noting the increased focus on human rights following World War II); Thomas
Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights,
19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 706 (1997) (observing that World War II influenced the
United Nations’ role in protecting individual’s rights); James Raymond Vreeland,
Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG. 65, 71 (2008) (noting the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment as one of World War II’s legacies).
2 See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 705 (discussing the evolution of
international human rights, with the first stage of the evolution lasting from the
entry into force of the United Nations Charter through the 1966 adoption of
International Covenants on Human Rights).
3 Treaty texts and information about their status is on file with the Secretary
General of the United Nations at the United Nations Treaty Collection. See
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Chapter IV: Human Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Treaties],
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012) (regarding the core human rights treaties).
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Table 1: The Six Main International Human Rights Treaties
Treaty
International Covenant
on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)
International Covenant
on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
International Convention
on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD)
Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)
Convention Against
Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)
Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC)

Year
Open
1966

1966

Rights Protected
Life, Liberty, Freedom
from Torture and
Slavery
Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights

Parties4
166

160

1966

Fundamental and
Human Rights for
Persons of All Races

173

1980

Fundamental and
Human Rights for
Women

185

1984

Freedom from Torture
and Other Forms of
Punishment

147

1989

Fundamental and
Human Rights for
Children

193

One might think states would only join5 treaties embodying
principles they believe in and with goals they intend to further.
But, is this true in the context of international human rights
treaties?
Does the fact that the majority of states have
overwhelmingly committed to this international human rights
regime mean that most states are also committed to protecting
human rights and ensuring that those who abuse human rights are
brought to justice? Or does something else explain the tendency of
states to willingly commit to a regime which, at least on paper,
purports to infringe on state sovereignty by requiring the state to
conduct its domestic affairs in a way that will not run afoul of
States parties are listed as of August 2010.
I use the words “join” or “commit” to refer to a state’s decision to ratify an
international human rights treaty.
4
5
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treaty requirements without offering any tangible benefits
according to treaty terms?
Although various theories have been advanced to explain state
commitment to human rights treaties, some evidence suggests
states join international human rights treaties somewhat
indiscriminately and perhaps as window dressing only.6 Because
many international human rights treaties have nonexistent or weak
enforcement mechanisms—often only requiring that states selfreport compliance—states may view commitment as essentially
costless from a sovereignty standpoint.7 In fact, scholars have
6 See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1374 (2005)
(suggesting that states may ratify human rights treaties only for window dressing
purposes, given that the average state has ratified a steadily increasing number of
human rights treaties but the percentage of states reportedly repressing human
rights has grown over time); Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1821, 1856–58 (2003) [hereinafter Hathaway, Cost of Commitment] (finding
that non-democratic states with poor human rights ratings are just as likely, and
sometimes even more likely, to commit to international human rights treaties than
non-democratic states with better human rights ratings); Oona A. Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1982–87 (2002)
[hereinafter Hathaway, Make a Difference?] (showing, for example, that
approximately the same percentage of countries with the most recorded acts of
torture ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment as did countries with no recorded acts of
torture).
7 For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, states agree to submit reports on the measures they have taken to give
effect to the Covenant’s provisions. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 40, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“The States
Parties . . . undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which
give effect to the rights recognized . . . .”). The texts of the five other core
international human rights treaties similarly provide that states self-report
compliance. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 44, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 44 [hereinafter CRC] (“States Parties undertake to submit to the
Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and
on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights . . . .”); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art.
19, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter CAT] (“The States Parties shall
submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under
this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for
the State Party concerned.”); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, arts. 18, 21, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter CEDAW] (requesting States Parties to submit reports for
consideration by the CEDAW Committee, and instructing the CEDAW
Committee to “make suggestions and general recommendations based on the
examination of reports and information received from the States Parties”);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 16, 17, Dec.
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found that past and present practices (presumably indicators of the
state’s commitment to, and ability to comply with, the principles
embodied by treaties promoting good human rights practices) are
not real indicators of whether a state will join an international
treaty protecting human rights. Rather, some studies have found
that states with poor human rights records are often just as likely
to commit as are states with good records.8 Furthermore, studies
have shown that many states continue their poor practices despite
the fact that they have ratified a treaty condemning such practices.9
Recently, however, the international community created an
international human rights treaty with a stronger enforcement
mechanism designed to induce compliance with treaty terms. In
July 1998, states adopted the Rome Statute and created the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”).10 The ICC is the first
permanent, treaty-based international criminal court established to
help end impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11 Unlike
previous treaties, the ICC treaty contains significant, legally
binding, and precise enforcement mechanisms.
First, by
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (enumerating the procedures states
must follow when submitting “reports on the measures which they have adopted
and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized” in
the Covenant); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 9, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter CERD] (requiring
states to submit “a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other
measures which they have adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this
Convention”).
8 See Hathaway, Make a Difference?, supra note 6, at 1982 (“[C]ountries with
the worst Genocide ratings are just about as likely as those with the best to have
ratified the Genocide Convention.”); Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6,
at 1856 (finding empirical evidence to support the proposition that “countries
with better human rights ratings are apparently more reluctant to commit to
human rights treaties than otherwise expected and countries with poor ratings are
less reluctant to do so than otherwise expected”).
9 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 6, at 1378 (“As external pressures
decrease, governments often spiral into worse repression after ratification, and the
human rights legal regime remains powerless to stop this process.”).
10 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
11 See id. pmbl. paras. 4–5, arts. 5–8. Beginning after January 1, 2017, and
assuming the parties to the Rome Statute vote to amend the statute accordingly,
the ICC will also have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. See Review
Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, ¶¶ 2, 3(3)
(June 11, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC
-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
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committing to the ICC, states agree that the Court has automatic
jurisdiction over those core crimes.12 States also agree that an
independent ICC Prosecutor may initiate investigations against the
state’s nationals for the covered crimes either on his own with the
approval of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber, or based on referrals
from a State Party or the United Nations Security Council.13
However, both the Prosecutor and the Court operate without
direct United Nations Security Council oversight, and the Council
has no power to veto decisions to investigate particular
situations.14 In addition, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute even
heads of state and does not recognize any immunity states may
have otherwise granted to such actors who engage in criminal
activity that falls within the Court’s jurisdiction.15
Finally, although it is true that the ICC operates as a court of
last resort, under the “complementary” provision of the Rome
Statute, the ICC will obtain jurisdiction over the nationals of States
Parties where the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to
proceed with a case.16 “Unwillingness” includes instances where
national proceedings are a sham or are inconsistent with an
intention to bring the person to justice, either because such
proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are not conducted
independently or impartially.17 A nation’s “inability” to prosecute
includes instances where, because of the collapse or unavailability
12 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2) (listing the crimes and
explaining the Court’s jurisdiction).
13 See id. arts. 13–15.
14 See Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and The Security Council:
Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE 143–52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (explaining that the objective of article
13(b) of the Rome Statute is to avoid a special tribunal or oversight by the Security
Council). See also Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 53 (“[T]he ICC prosecutor and court are
unaccountable to any democratic institution or elected official.”); Christopher
Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55
INT’L ORG. 655, 679–80 (2001) (explaining that Article 16 of the Rome Statute does
not give single members of the Security Council veto power, but rather only
defers prosecution through a unanimous vote of the Security Council).
15 Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 27.
16 Id. pmbl. para. 10, art. 17(1)(a).
17 Id. art. 17(2) (stating that in determining “unwillingness,” the Court shall
consider whether “(a) [t]he proceedings were or are being undertaken . . . for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility . . . ; (b)
[t]here has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings . . . ; [and] (c) [t]he
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially . . .
.”).
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of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused
or the necessary evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the
proceedings.18 The Court—as opposed to States Parties to the
Rome Statute—determines whether the “unwilling or unable”
bases for proceeding before the ICC have been met, thus further
demonstrating the strength and independence of the ICC’s
enforcement mechanisms.
The existence of the ICC treaty offers an excellent opportunity
to test whether and how the design of international human rights
treaties influences state commitment decisions. Building on the
logic advanced by Oona Hathaway,19 I argue that state
commitment to international human rights treaties is a function of
two considerations relative to the costs of failing to comply with
treaty terms: (1) the institutional design of the treaty—specifically,
the strength of its enforcement mechanisms—and (2) the state’s
level of domestic human rights practices. States should be more
likely to ratify a given treaty if (1) the treaty’s enforcement
mechanisms are weak (such that compliance with treaty terms may
be irrelevant) or (2) the treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are
relatively strong, but the state’s recent past and present human
rights practices indicate that it can comply with treaty terms. Thus,
empirically we should still see that states with bad human rights
practices20 will regularly and readily commit to treaties with weak
enforcement mechanisms. However, states should view stronger
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and commit only if
18 Id. art. 17(3) (the Court will find “inability” where, “due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”).
19 The present study goes beyond Hathaway’s 2003 examination of state
commitment to international human rights treaties. Hathaway purposely studied
ratification of only four different treaties using two independent variables of
interest—namely, a state’s human rights ratings and whether or not it was a
democracy—without accounting for the timing of ratifications. See Hathaway,
Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1849 (arguing that democratic countries are
more likely to join human rights treaties than nondemocratic countries.). In a later
study, Hathaway included additional variables testing commitment to several
human rights treaties using a Cox proportional hazards model, though her study
did not include the ICC. See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to
Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 592 (2007) (maintaining that the
effect of human rights treaties on states depends on the treaties’ domestic
enforcement and collateral consequences).
20 In the empirical tests, I use a state’s human rights ratings as a proxy for its
human rights practices. See infra Section 5.3 (measuring and comparing the
human rights practices of various states).
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the state’s rational calculations concerning the strength of its
domestic human rights practices indicate that it should be able to
comply with treaty terms and thereby avoid costly infringements
on its sovereignty.
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the relationship
between treaty enforcement mechanisms and likelihood of
ratification across a broad range of treaties. I test the credible
threat theory in the context of the six main international human
rights treaties and their associated articles and optional protocols,
as well as the ICC treaty. I categorize the resulting fourteen treaty
commitment possibilities according to five different levels of
enforcement mechanisms, which range from self-reporting to the
ICC treaty’s independent Prosecutor and Court.21 Although the
empirical results cannot be conclusive, they do provide support for
the explanatory power of the credible threat theory. The results of
event history analysis from 1966 to 2008 indicate that states with
poorer human rights ratings more regularly commit to
international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement
mechanisms. However, states with poor ratings are less likely to
commit to the ICC, suggesting that states view those stronger
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and are more likely to
commit if they can comply with treaty terms. This further suggests
that states with poor human rights practices may not join
international human rights treaties because they do not want to be
held accountable for respecting and protecting the lives of their
citizenry. Rather, at least some states may ratify these treaties only
because commitment costs are cheap and the consequences of
noncompliance are trivial. On the other hand, where enforcement
21 As discussed in Section 4.2, some of the international human rights treaties
included within this study have optional articles whereby states can agree to
additional enforcement measures. For example, states may recognize the
competence of a committee to consider complaints of one state against another
claiming the party is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty. See, e.g.,
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 41(1) (“A State Party to the present Covenant may at any
time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee
to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant.”).
States may also recognize the competence of a committee to hear complaints by
individuals alleging the state has violated treaty terms. See, e.g., CAT, supra note
6, art. 22(1) (“A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare . . . that it
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who
claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the
Convention.”).
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mechanisms are relatively strong, the statistical evidence indicates
that calculations about the costs of commitment significantly
influence state ratification behavior.
This Article is organized into six sections. Section 2 provides a
brief overview of the international human rights regime. Section 3
follows with a review of the existing literature explaining state
commitment to international human rights treaties. In Section 4, I
discuss more fully my theory about the credible threat associated
with stronger enforcement mechanisms and how that threat
influences state ratification behavior. I also explain how I
categorize the various treaties included in this study according to
five different levels of enforcement mechanisms. In Section 5, I
describe the research design of the empirical analysis. Section 6
presents the results of the statistical tests. The conclusion in
Section 7 addresses implications of the empirical results and
outlines avenues for future research.
2.

THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME

The international human rights regime is a relatively new
creation. Only following World War II, and essentially motivated
by the destruction caused by that war, did the international
community focus on creating a systematic regime designed to
protect the basic human rights of all individuals.22 Those basic
human rights were defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General
Assembly.23 The UDHR expressed an idea that was revolutionary
22 See BOUANDEL, supra note 1 (analyzing the evolution of international
human rights regimes since the Second World War); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 23 (2009) (detailing
the systematic process behind drafting declarations on human rights);
Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 705 (discussing the rise of human rights instruments,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the immediate aftermath of
World War II); Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to
the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966–1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 472, 474–75
(2005) (relating the systematic nature of modern human rights protocols);
Vreeland, supra note 1, at 71 (asserting that numerous human rights conventions,
including the Convention Against Torture, arose from the legacy of World War
II); Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23
SOC. F. 724, 729 (2008) (claiming that the devastation of World War II provided an
impetus for the U.N. and its member states to seek to protect universal rights,
which until then had not been a pronounced or unified international goal).
23 See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L
ORG. 599, 606 (1986) (discussing the enunciation of civil, political, economic,
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at the time: human rights were universal in character, and the
international community had an obligation to ensure those rights
were protected without regard to international boundaries or
states’ sovereign rights.24 Although the UDHR was only a
declaratory document and not binding on states, it paved the way
for numerous international institutions designed to promote and
protect human rights.
As noted above, the ICCPR and the ICESCR—initially drafted
in 1954—are the foundation of the international human rights
regime. Additional binding treaties followed the drafting of the
two Covenants. For example, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”)
entered into force in 1969. The Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”) was adopted in December 1984 and entered into force in
1987 when the required number of states had ratified the treaty.
The international human rights regime also expanded to include
institutions aimed at protecting particular groups from systematic
discrimination. Although Article 3 of the ICCPR prohibited
discrimination against women, in 1979, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a comprehensive treaty designed to promote
the equal rights for women and the protection of women against
all forms of discrimination. That treaty—the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”)—was opened for signature in 1980 and entered into
force in 1981. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”)
entered into force in 1990.25
Binding international treaties constitute the foundation and
principle substance of the international human rights regime, the
idea being that the binding nature of these international
institutions can make them a strong and effective instrument to
promote and protect global human rights. International human
rights treaties are adopted and opened for signature by the United
Nations General Assembly and require signatures and ratifications
social, and cultural rights in the UDHR); Vreeland, supra note 1, at 71 (positing
that the content of “human rights” was principally advanced through the UDHR).
24 Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 21, at 729–30 (maintaining that the UDHR
and the Charter of the United Nations were the first “concerted efforts” to protect
universal human rights, and that the ideas contained in the UDHR were
“revolutionary in international relations and international law” for their intended
universal application).
25 See U.N. Human Rights Treaties, supra note 3.
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by a particular number of countries in order to enter into force.
Only by ratifying or acceding to the treaty (which is the process
states use where they have not previously signed the treaty) are
states legally bound by treaty terms. Furthermore, a government’s
ability to ratify a treaty depends on its own domestic rules
regarding ratification: some governments may bind their states to
treaties based only on the will of a chief executive while others
need the approval of a significant vote of a legislative body or
bodies. Finally, until they enter into force, treaties have no binding
effect on governments.
These international human rights treaties usually have some
enforcement mechanism that is ostensibly designed to hold states
accountable to their treaty commitments. In the international
human rights context, that enforcement mechanism is most
typically under the control of a committee of experts established
pursuant to the text of the treaty. Although terms differ, most
treaties provide for a committee to monitor state compliance by
examining reports that states are required to submit commenting
on their own human rights practices. Committees reviewing these
reports can typically question states about them and also make
comments about the state’s level of treaty compliance. However,
the committees have no power to order sanctions or otherwise
punish states for their failure to live up to treaty terms. Thus,
states that file even the most perfunctory of reports likely have
sufficiently complied with treaty terms.26
Some treaties and protocols, however, allow states to bind
themselves to additional committee oversight of their practices.
States can agree on the committee’s competence to hear complaints
by other states claiming that they are not living up to their
obligations under the treaty.27 Some treaties further allow states to
agree on the committee’s competence to hear complaints by
individuals alleging that their rights under the treaty have been
violated—if the individuals have, among other things, exhausted

26 JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (3d ed. 2007) (noting
both the benefits and shortcomings of the reporting procedure of the ICCPR’s
Human Rights Committee).
27 See CAT, supra note 6, art. 21 (“A State Party to this Convention may at any
time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee
to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention.”);
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 41 (similar).
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available domestic remedies.28 Finally, some treaties provide that
states can recognize the competence of the committee to visit their
territory and grant the committee access to relevant information
about potential violations of the rights protected by the treaty.29 In
each of these cases, the state binds itself to increasingly greater
impositions on its sovereign rights to regulate domestic affairs. In
addition, if a state cannot be persuaded to comply with the
committee’s recommendations regarding complaints or other
violations uncovered during any investigations, the committee can
issue reports about the state’s non-compliance and possibly also
make a public statement on the matter.30 However, the committees
have “no authority to act punitively against the offending state, or
impose any sanctions” for noncompliance.31
In recent years, however, the scope of the international human
rights regime has broadened. Until the 1990s, most treaties had as
their primary focus holding governments, as opposed to
individuals, accountable for ensuring the protection of human
rights within their states, not only by promoting good human
rights standards, but also by punishing those who violated the

28 By committing to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, states may
agree that individuals can bring complaints against them alleging violations of the
ICCPR. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter ICCPR First Optional
Protocol]. Similar provisions are contained in Article 14 of the CERD, supra note
6; Article 22 of the CAT, supra note 6; and in the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW.
See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83, 97
[hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol].
29 In committing to the Optional Protocol to the CAT, a state recognizes the
competence of the Subcommittee on Prevention to regularly visit any place under
the state’s jurisdiction and control where persons are held in detention by the
government or with its acquiescence. See Optional Protocol to Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, arts. 4, 11, Dec. 18, 2002, 2375 U.N.T.S 237 [hereinafter CAT Optional
Protocol].
30 See ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 5, 6 (establishing the
Human Rights Committee’s procedural guidelines following submission of an
individual communication, including summarizing its activity in its annual
report); CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 7, 12 (similar, with regard
to the CEDAW Committee).
31 Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 15, 36–37 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
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standards imposed.32 Recognizing that some governments either
were the rights violators or were essentially powerless to protect
their citizenry from the abuses meted out by some groups or
criminal organizations, the international community actively
turned towards creating an institution that would help to end
impunity for mass atrocities where states themselves were either
unwilling or unable to do so. In this regard, and after many years
of negotiations, in July 1998 during a United Nations conference in
Rome, states adopted a treaty—the Rome Statute—creating the
International Criminal Court.33 In July 2002 after the required sixty
states had ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC came into existence.34
States committing to the ICC treaty agree to cede to an
independent Prosecutor the power to prosecute the state’s own
nationals for mass atrocities should the Prosecutor and the ICC’s
Pre-Trial Chamber determine the state is unwilling or unable to do
so domestically.
3.

EXISTING LITERATURE ON STATE COMMITMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

A number of scholars have offered theories to explain why
states might decide to ratify treaties designed to hold the state to
domestically promoting and protecting human rights. I group that
literature under the following two labels: (1) the “rationalist view”
and (2) the “external pressures view.” Within the “rationalist
view,” I include theories that focus primarily on the direct costs
and benefits of treaty commitment. Under this view, states will
commit to treaties where the costs of commitment are low, where
compliance is otherwise not costly because the state can comply
with treaty terms, or where commitment costs are outweighed by
specific domestic benefits the state may derive by binding itself to
the treaty’s terms. Under the “external pressures view,” I include
theories that look beyond direct cost and benefit calculations to
explain treaty commitment. For example, even where a state
32 See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 717–20 (discussing the expanded the
concept of international responsibility for violations of human rights, which now
includes individuals and groups in addition to governments).
33 See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 23 (1999) (outlining the negotiation process which
culminated in the Rome Conference).
34 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (3d ed. 2007) (describing the origins, initial rulings, and
functioning of the International Criminal Court).
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cannot comply with treaty terms, it may be persuaded that
ratifying treaties embracing positive norms may be the appropriate
thing to do if the state wants to be viewed as a legitimate player on
the world stage and one worthy of obtaining extra-treaty benefits,
such as aid and trade.35 Richer and more powerful states may also
pressure other weaker states to join international human rights
treaties by threatening to withhold extra-treaty benefits if the state
does not at least signal its intention to abide by international norms
calling for states to domestically protect against human rights
abuses.
3.1. The Rationalist View
Under a rationalist view, states will consider their own material
interests and only join treaties where the costs of commitment are
small or outweighed by benefits that can be derived from that
commitment.36 States may calculate those costs, however, in more
or less retrospective or prospective ways. States may look to their
past practices and actions as a guide to determining whether treaty
commitment is likely to be relatively costless even if enforcement
mechanisms are strong. On the other hand, even if a state’s past
and present human rights practices suggest that compliance with
treaty terms may be difficult, a state’s commitment decisions may
be guided by rational calculations about whether binding itself to
the treaty’s terms can provide overriding future benefits.
3.1.1. Rationalist and Retrospective Calculations
3.1.1.1. Domestic Practice and Policy Compliance Costs
For example, scholars advancing a rationalist view of state
ratification behavior suggest that states will avoid costly
commitments and be more likely to join treaties with which they
can easily comply and which will impose few, if any, limitations on
their sovereignty. Indeed, George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter
35 See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 160–62 (1989) (discussing political
institutions and how they function, how they affect political life, how they change,
and how they might be improved).
36 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1860 (2002) (suggesting that the rationalist view of state
behavior provides predictions about how countries will act inasmuch as it
assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and proceed
where benefits outweigh costs).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

01 DUTTON (DO NOT DELETE)

16

1/18/2013 5:10 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:1

Barsoom argue that the primary reason we may see widespread
compliance with many treaties is because states have a tendency to
join only those treaties that do not require them to depart from
what they would have done in the absence of the treaty.37 In short,
states will view compliance costs—and the concomitant loss to
state sovereignty—as minimal and will tend to join treaties with
which their past and present practices and policies are already
consistent.38
In the case of international human rights treaties, state
calculations about policy similarity and compliance costs will
likely center on the state’s domestic political configuration and its
past and present human rights practices. In fact, much literature
suggests that democracies generally should be more likely than
autocracies to commit to treaties requiring them to protect against
human rights abuses. After all, democratic states generally protect
basic human rights, apply the rule of law fairly, and limit state
power. Therefore, for those states, ratification of human rights
treaties should be essentially costless since commitment will
produce little, if any, change to the status quo ante.39 For autocratic
regimes, however, ratification may be quite costly. Because
autocratic regimes tend not to place legal restraints on their own
power, commitment to international human rights treaties could
require significant policy change in order to ensure the state does
not run afoul of treaty terms, policies, and goals.40 Even aside from
a state’s domestic political configuration, however, a state’s
practices and policies regarding individual human rights should
enter into rational compliance cost calculations. States with a
recent history of better human rights practices should find
commitment less costly, and the risks to state sovereignty of
noncompliance less significant, than states with a history of worse
practices.41
37 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News
about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996)
(explaining the major limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from the
compliance evidence alone).
38 Id. (emphasizing that states will rarely spend a great amount of time and
effort in negotiating agreements that will continually be violated).
39 See Cole, supra note 22, at 475–76.
40 See id. (contrasting autocratic regimes with democracies).
41 See id.; Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 737–38 (summarizing the
hypothesis that correlates extant human rights practices and policies with the
likelihood of treaty ratification).
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Along these same lines, Christine Wotipka and Kiyoteru
Tsutsui argue that compliance with human rights norms may be
easier for wealthier and more developed countries since those
countries may already have in place policies permitting ready
compliance with most international human rights treaties.42 They
note that economically developed countries tend to be more
politically stable and also have citizens who embrace progress and
post-materialist values—such as the need to protect citizens against
human rights abuses.43 On the other hand, countries that are less
economically developed may not be able to devote sufficient
resources to ensuring that human rights are protected, particularly
if the economic situation also leads to violence or political
instability.
Those states may find that compliance with
international human rights treaties would require a substantial
commitment to policy change—a fact that may cause them to avoid
ratifying.
Finally, the costs of complying with international human rights
treaties may be reduced even for states with practices and policies
that do not conform to treaty terms where the mechanisms to
enforce compliance are weak or nonexistent.44 To the extent that
enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough to hold states to
their commitment and punish bad and noncompliant behavior,
even rights-abusing states may rationally conclude that
commitment is warranted and also relatively costless.
Indeed, some empirical evidence supports the notion that state
commitment decisions are influenced at least in part by states’
42 Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 737 (summarizing the hypothesis that
a state’s likelihood of ratifying human rights treaties increases as the level of
development and their citizens’ awareness of human rights increases).
43 See generally RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING
VALUES AND POLITICAL STYLES AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS (1977) (analyzing the shift
in value of Western publics from an emphasis on material well-being and physical
security towards greater emphasis on the quality of life); RONALD INGLEHART,
CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990) (examining the changes in
public opinion toward religious beliefs, motives for work, and various social
issues, such as divorce and abortion).
44 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1832, 1834–36
(observing that states with poor human rights practices, in some cases, ratify
human rights treaties where the cost of complying with the treaty, as determined
by the strength of its enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, are low). Cf.
Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note 36, at 383, 388–92 (finding that a treaty may
have weak or nonexistent enforcement mechanisms where the terms of the treaty
do not bind participant states to any more than that to which those states would
have otherwise committed).
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perceptions about the strength of the treaty’s enforcement
mechanisms. In her study examining state commitment to four
different human rights treaties requiring only that states report
their level of compliance, Oona Hathaway found that nondemocracies with poor human rights ratings were just as likely,
and sometimes even more likely, than non-democracies with better
human rights ratings to ratify. Hathaway attributed this finding to
the treaties’ weak enforcement mechanisms and also the absence of
domestic enforcement mechanisms in the form of an active and
vocal civil society or others who ordinarily push for better
practices in democracies.45 On the other hand, my own statistical
tests of ICC commitment using event history analysis showed that
states with worse human rights practices and non-democracies
were less likely to join the Court than were states with better
practices.46
These findings suggest that where enforcement
mechanisms are stronger—as they are in the ICC treaty—states
will be more likely to ratify only where their compliance cost
calculations suggest they can comply with treaty terms and avoid
costly sovereignty losses.
3.1.1.2. Costs of Domestic Ratification Processes
Beth Simmons identifies the political domestic ratification
process as another cost that governments may calculate when
deciding whether to commit to international treaties.47 In order to
bind themselves to international treaties, states must follow
45 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1856 (asserting that,
because democratic states generally have “stronger internal enforcement
mechanisms” than non-democratic states, democracies and non-democracies are
likely to have disparate commitment patterns).
46 See Yvonne M. Dutton, Explaining State Commitment to the International
Criminal Court: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat, 10 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) (arguing that commitment to an international
human rights treaty is a function of the strength of the treaty’s enforcement
mechanism and of the strength of a state’s internal policies and enforcement
mechanisms). The results of event history analysis showed that a state’s level of
human rights practices was a highly significant and positive predictor of ICC
treaty ratification. Id. at 520. In fact, with each unit increase in a state’s human
rights rating, the state became between 30% and 38% more likely to commit to the
ICC. Id. The results also showed that democracies were more likely than nondemocracies to join the Court. Id. at 521–23.
47 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 68 (identifying as “legal integration costs”
those costs that stem from executive-legislative relations, those that stem from the
nature of the legal system itself, and those that stem from power-sharing in
federal systems).
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whatever domestic processes are required to make any ratification
legal and legitimate. The political costs associated with treaty
ratification will be lowest, as Simmons notes, when the
government fully controls the process, such as where the head of
state has the sole right to make ratification decisions.48 States that
must undertake a more onerous process, however, may find treaty
ratification politically more costly. Indeed, as in the United States,
some states may require an affirmative supermajority vote of their
legislature before the government is permitted to bind itself to an
international treaty. Where the number of domestic “legislative
veto players” is larger, governments may face opposition to, or
delays in, the treaty ratification process that can make ratifying an
international human rights treaty too politically costly to pursue.49
3.1.2. Rationalist and Prospective Calculations
3.1.2.1. Future Domestic Uncertainty Costs
By contrast to the rationalist theories discussed above, which
emphasize the backward-looking calculations states may engage in
when making commitment decisions, some rationalist theories
instead focus on more prospective and forward-looking
calculations. For example, treaty ratification may cause some
states—particularly those that follow a common law legal
tradition—to incur future domestic uncertainty costs.50 In the
common law tradition, as opposed to the civil law tradition, the
judiciary is generally independent from the government and there
is some possibility that it will apply treaty law in a way that creates

48 Id. (noting that in such instances, where the executive has sole prerogative
both to negotiate and to ratify a treaty, “ratification follows virtually
automatically from the signing of the text”).
49 See id. at 68–69 (noting that the higher the number of legislative veto
players in a state, the higher the “ratification hurdle” and the less the state is likely
to ratify an international agreement).
50 See id. at 71 (arguing that features typical to common law systems,
including an emphasis on judge-made law and judicial independence, result in
legal dualism and thus provide incentives for governments to take a slower
approach to treaty ratification); see also Jay Goodliffe & Darren G. Hawkins,
Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention Against Torture, 68 J. POL. 358, 364
(2006) (explaining that judges in common law judicial systems may apply
international treaties by drawing on legal sources beyond a statutory code, thus
creating unintended commitment costs for states).
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new government obligations to the state’s citizens and others.51
Therefore, even for states with present practices and policies that
would otherwise make compliance with treaty terms relatively
costless, this future uncertainty about how treaty law will be
applied after ratification may cause common law states to be wary
of ratifying international human rights treaties.
3.1.2.2. Future Hand-Tying Benefits
3.1.2.2.1. Credible Commitment
Other scholars suggest that states may rationally commit to
certain international human rights treaties in order to obtain future
hand-tying benefits—notwithstanding that their past and present
domestic political configurations and prevailing human rights
practices suggest an inability to comply with treaty terms. In their
study of state commitment to the ICC, Beth Simmons and Allison
Danner argue that for non-democracies with poor human rights
practices, the sovereignty costs of joining the Court are outweighed
by the potential future benefits the state can obtain by binding
itself to the ICC treaty’s strong enforcement mechanisms.52
Specifically, by ratifying the ICC treaty, those autocratic states with
poor human rights practices can credibly commit to their domestic
audiences to end their past cycles of violence and, instead, respond
non-violently to crises in the future.53 Simmons’ and Danner’s
statistical results from event history analysis produce some
support for their theory. They find that states that have recently
experienced mass atrocities and that have poor practices are likely
to join the ICC as long as those states also have weak institutions of
domestic accountability.54
51 SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 73–74 (“[A] greater range of interpretative
possibilities from a highly independent judiciary makes it more difficult to know
ex ante how any particular treaty will be interpreted.”).
52 See Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 233–36 (2010) (noting that
governments that face domestic turmoil and suffer from weak domestic
enforcement mechanisms may commit to international treaties with strong
enforcement provisions in order to credibly commit to a peaceable domestic
agreement).
53 Id. at 234 (“Joining the ICC greatly enhances the risk for states of future
punishment of their senior leaders, at least by comparison to a regime of
impunity.”).
54 Id. at 252–53. Though Simmons and Danner did find support for their
theory, one can question whether they used the best measure for a state’s
tendency to commit mass atrocities. They measured this concept using data on
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Nevertheless, I am more persuaded by the logic of the theories
positing that states will be more backward-looking in calculating
the costs of committing to international human rights treaties.
According to those theories, states will commit only where their
calculations indicate they can presently comply with treaty terms—
unless, of course, treaty enforcement mechanisms are so weak that
bad and noncompliant behavior cannot be punished. It is true that
some states may decide to join the ICC despite their bad practices
and so as to force themselves to be better in the future. But,
autocracies may not overwhelmingly decide to act in this manner.
Rather, since autocratic regimes with bad practices have declined
to limit their power domestically, those states may not be inclined
to relinquish their sovereignty to an international institution that
can punish them for practices they may not have made punishable
domestically. While such states may rationally conclude that
committing to treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms is
relatively costless, committing to an international institution with
strong enforcement mechanisms that can punish bad and
noncompliant behavior is another matter. Indeed, Hathaway’s
study showed that autocratic states with bad human rights
practices regularly commit to international human rights treaties
with very weak enforcement mechanisms—mechanisms that
would not enable them to signal to their domestic audiences any
real credible commitment to change their policies and practices.55
whether the state had experienced a civil war with more than twenty-five deaths
per year during the period between 1990 and 1998. Id. at 238. However, twentyfive battle deaths in one year does not necessarily capture “violent states” or states
at risk of committing mass atrocities since twenty-five battle deaths is not a very
large number and does not address whether the government is responsible for
those deaths as a result of any “criminal” action or other poor practices. Nor are
twenty-five battle deaths sufficient to constitute a civil war as most scholars
understand it. Rather, the widely-used Correlates of War dataset classifies civil
wars as those having at least one thousand war-related casualties per year of
conflict. See Meredith Reid Sarkees, Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0:
Definitions and Variables 1–2, COW, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/Intra-StateWars_Codebook.pdf (last visited Oct.
12, 2012); Meredith Reid Sarkees, The COW Typology of War: Defining and
Categorizing
Wars
(Version
4
of
the
Data)
5,
COW,
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW%
20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf (last visited, Oct. 12, 2012).
55 See
Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1856–57
(“[N]ondemocratic nations with worse human rights ratings are not much less
likely—and are even occasionally more likely—to commit than nondemocratic
nations with better ratings. . . . [I]f we . . . settle for toothless treaties, nations with
poor human rights records—especially nondemocratic nations—may join them to
gain an expressive benefit with no intention of actually complying.”).
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Accordingly, I expect that non-democracies with poor practices
will typically be more backward-looking in rationally calculating
the costs associated with joining an international human rights
treaty and be wary of joining treaties other than those with weak
enforcement mechanisms.
3.1.2.2.2. Democratic Lock-In
Finally, Andrew Moravcsik also theorizes that some states will
have reasons to be forward-looking in rationally calculating the
costs and benefits of treaty commitment. Moravcsik suggests that
for newly transitioning democracies, the sovereignty costs
associated with joining international human rights treaties can be
outweighed by the benefits of locking in the treaty’s principles and
thereby constraining the activities of future governments that may
seek to subvert democracy.56 In his study of state commitment to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, he found that dictatorships and
established democracies voted against binding human rights
guarantees during treaty negotiations, whereas the newly created
democracies supported binding guarantees.57 Accordingly, some
newly democratic countries may conclude that the costs of
complying with international human rights treaties are relatively
low since they would have adopted—or at least intended to
adopt—domestic policies that are consistent with treaty terms.
Furthermore, the benefits that new democracies may realize by
locking future governments in to following their liberal policies
may outweigh the risk that the state may not be able to
immediately and fully comply with treaty terms. Nevertheless,
56 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 225–30 (2000) (presenting the
“republican liberal” explanation of the benefits of commitment to international
treaties, and arguing that “recently established and potentially unstable
democracies” facing real threats from nondemocratic domestic groups are the
regimes most likely to accept a reduction in sovereignty in exchange for a
reduction in political uncertainty).
57 Id. at 232–233 (identifying Austria, France, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, and
Germany—states only continuously democratic beginning between 1920 and
1950—as “new democracies” voting against the ECHR). Cf. Edward D. Mansfield
& Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization and International Organizations, 60 INT’L ORG.
137, 138 (2006) (arguing that newly democratizing nations are especially likely to
enter international organizations because doing so would allow the state to
“credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms and . . . reduce the prospect of
reversions to authoritarianism”).
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scholars empirically examining state commitment to the
Convention Against Torture and the ICC treaty found little
support for the explanatory power of the democratic lock-in
theory.58
3.2. The External Pressures View
According to some other theories, states will commit to
international human rights treaties even if rational cost and benefit
calculations show that compliance with treaty terms may be
difficult or impossible—meaning that a state could risk significant
sovereignty losses if the treaty contains strong enforcement
mechanisms.
In addition to the general pressure to act
appropriately and consistently with international norms, states
may experience external pressures from others—such as powerful
states, non-governmental organizations, and civil society—to join
international institutions embodying and furthering these norms.
Although they would prefer to guard their sovereignty and avoid
constraints on their ability to govern domestically, states may join
international human rights treaties in the hopes that ratification
will make them appear more legitimate, and thus worthy of extratreaty benefits such as investment, aid, and trade.59 As Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton notes, many states are required to commit to

58 See Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 365 (finding no statistically
significant correlation between the age or stability of a democracy or the volatility
of the regime and the likelihood of signing or ratifying the CAT); Jay Goodliffe &
Darren Hawkins, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining
International Criminal Court Negotiations, 71 J. POL. 977, 994 (2009) (finding a “lack
of correlation” between countries’ level of democracy and support for the
International Criminal Court, and thus no strong evidence for Moravcsik’s lock-in
hypothesis).
59 See, e.g., Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 361 (describing this “logic
of consequences” explanation of incentivized behavior); Beth A. Simmons,
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International
Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819–20 (2000) (arguing that
reputational concerns drive international treaty compliance); SIMMONS, supra note
22, at 77 (suggesting that governments may have no intention of complying with
treaty obligations and instead have ulterior motives for ratifying treaties such as
the expectation of positive publicity stemming from ratification or the expectation
that more tangible benefits, such as favorable trade terms, will flow from
ratification); Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 734–35 (explaining that
ratification follows from weaker states’ desire to demonstrate their legitimacy and
credibility to more powerful states in order to receive benefits from powerful
states).
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improving certain domestic human rights practices in order to
obtain the benefits of certain preferential trade agreements.60
States may also be pressured directly or indirectly to commit to
the treaties their neighbors ratify so as to signal that they are
legitimate members of the region. Thus, even if a state cannot
comply with treaty terms, it may conclude that appearing like its
neighbors can produce other extra-treaty benefits—for example,
participation in regional trade arrangements61—that can outweigh
the sovereignty costs of commitment, at least where treaty
enforcement mechanisms are weak.
4.

COMPLIANCE COSTS AND THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF
STRONG ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

4.1. The Credible Threat Theory
My argument about state commitment to international human
rights treaties is in the rationalist family, but is retrospective in
nature. I argue that a state’s decision about whether to join
international human rights treaties depends on whether the state
has been good so far, not on whether the state would like to be
good in the future. I suggest states will view treaties with stronger
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and will be more
likely to commit only if their rational calculations about their past
behavior suggest they will be able to comply with treaty terms. I
pit the credible threat theory against the two other main alternative
theories described above which seek to explain state commitment
to international human rights treaties: (1) the rationalist and
prospective credible commitment theory advanced by Simmons
and Danner in their study of ICC commitment; and (2) the external
pressures theories.
My credible threat argument has two main components: (1) the
strength of the anticipated enforcement mechanism, and (2) the
state’s ability to comply with the terms of the treaty. As to the first
component, I focus on enforcement mechanisms because it is
through enforcement mechanisms that states can be held to their
60 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 595 (2005) (asserting
that preferential trade agreements that implement “hard” standards and a
“conditional supply of valuable goods” are more effective than softer human
rights agreements in changing the basic conduct of repressive governments).
61 See, e.g., Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 361 (describing the “logic
of consequences” view of state’s decision to ratify an international treaty).
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commitment agreeing to further the treaty’s goals and protect
individual human rights. I define an enforcement mechanism62 as
the formal grant of power from states to some entity or institution
with authority to oversee state compliance with treaty terms. The
weakest enforcement mechanisms lack clear obligations, precision,
or a precise delegation of authority or responsibility—”soft law” in
the language of Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal.63 Stronger,
“hard law” enforcement mechanisms are precise and binding and,
for example, will contain a formal grant of power to a committee or
court to engage in authoritative, institutionalized, and legally
binding decision-making.64 As Darren Hawkins argues, strong
enforcement mechanisms provide for authorized decision-makers
who are “officially empowered by states to interpret and apply the
rule of law, and control resources that can be used to prevent
abuses or to punish offenders.”65 States should view strong
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and be wary of
committing to treaties with such mechanisms unless they can
comply with treaty terms because non-compliance can be costly.
As to the second component—ability to comply, I focus
primarily on a state’s record of human rights practices. I argue
that states rationally calculating their ability to comply with treaty
terms should consider their past and present human rights
practices since that record can provide information about how the
state or its leaders will likely behave in the future. Where an
international human rights treaty contains stronger enforcement
mechanisms, states should view the treaty as a credible threat and
62 For this discussion about enforcement and legalization, I draw on the work
of several scholars. See Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly Institutions: Persuasion
and Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 779, 781 (2004) (explaining
that for enforcement to occur, the states must give agents power to “interpret and
apply” the law and to use resources to “prevent abuses or punish offenders.”);
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Legalization and World Politics: An Introduction, 54 INT’L
ORG. 401, 418 (2000) (noting centralized enforcement mechanisms in which
international agencies have the power to withhold benefits, technical assistance,
or rights of participation to violators); Donnelly, supra note 23, at 603–05 (stating
that the enforcement of international norms is one of the primary “international
decision-making activities” and involves stronger forms of international
monitoring).
63 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–24 (2000) (explaining that the sphere of “soft
law” begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation).
64 Id.
65 Hawkins, supra note 61, at 781.
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be more likely to commit only if they intend to and can comply
with the treaty’s terms. Where enforcement mechanisms are weak,
however, states may rationally commit regardless of their ability to
comply with treaty terms.
For several reasons, my credible threat argument is centered on
compliance costs specifically derived from the treaty text and
states’ backward looking calculations about the potential for
compliance with treaty terms. First, I emphasize costs, as opposed
to any benefits states may obtain by commitment, because on the
whole, by their terms, international human rights treaties do not
provide tangible reciprocal benefits to their members.66 Instead,
states should expect to have constraints imposed on how they can
act domestically towards their citizens, unless those states have
already imposed those same domestic constraints upon
themselves. Thus, commitment to international human rights
treaties requires the state to bind itself to act in a certain way. It is
true that by self-binding, states can hope to obtain the benefit of
encouraging other states to also bind themselves to respecting
human rights. And the ultimate outcome of all that binding may
be a more peaceful world and one in which states do not have to
engage in costly interventions to help “solve” other states’ human
rights abuses. It is also true, as the external pressure theories
predict, that some states may join treaties because they hope to
obtain extra-treaty benefits such as increased aid or trade.
However, while a state might be rational in ratifying toothless
treaties for those reasons, the credible threat theory predicts that
where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states will first
determine whether they can comply with treaty terms and thus
avoid a costly loss of sovereignty. Therefore, because international
human rights treaties by their terms purport to constrain state
domestic behavior, and because states can face a significant loss of
sovereignty should they violate treaty terms—as long as
enforcement mechanisms are strong—I expect states will first be
concerned with compliance costs when making ratification
decisions.
Second, I focus on the costs that flow from the treaty’s terms,
rather than costs a state might incur when deciding to ratify any
66 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1823 (noting that
international human rights treaties differ from arms control agreements and trade
agreements which, by their terms, provide concrete reciprocal benefits to states in
exchange for their commitment to act in particular ways).
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treaty—such as domestic ratification costs relating to the number
of legislative veto players—because those terms are the primary
guide of a state’s obligations and the risks it faces if it fails to
comply with those obligations. In addition, although in some cases
states may look to other similar treaties or the actions of treaty
bodies that oversee compliance with other similar treaties to help
them interpret the actual strength and meaning of a treaty’s
enforcement mechanisms, it is the actual treaty terms that describe
the enforcement mechanisms that will be applied to ensure
compliance with that treaty. Moreover, as to the ICC specifically,
since the ICC treaty is relatively new, states can really only look to
the treaty’s terms for information about the strength of the treaty’s
enforcement mechanisms to punish bad and noncompliant
behavior.
Finally, my credible threat argument concentrates on
retrospective, backward-looking cost calculations, rather than the
prospective calculations Simmons and Danner argue to explain
ICC commitment, for the reasons stated in Section 3.1.2.2.1 above.
Briefly, however, the very fact that an autocratic regime has
refused to implement domestic laws requiring it to improve its
practices or put in place other checks on its powers—by, for
example, appointing an independent judiciary—suggests that it
may not wish to commit itself to an international institution that
could impose restraints on its domestic behavior. Yet, that is
precisely the argument of the credible commitment theory:
autocracies with bad human rights practices will want to bind
themselves to a strong international enforcement mechanism in
order to tie their hands and force them to be good in the future.
While this theory may explain the behavior of some autocratic
states with bad practices, it seems reasonable to expect that most
states with these characteristics would not want to take the gamble
that they will not live up to their commitment and risk a loss of
sovereignty. Thus, the prediction of the credible threat theory is
essentially the opposite of the prediction of the credible
commitment theory. I expect to find that autocratic states and
states with worse human rights practices will readily commit to
international human rights treaties with weak enforcement
mechanisms, but will be wary of committing to treaties with strong
enforcement mechanisms like those contained in the ICC treaty.67
67 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1856–57 (finding that
states with worse human rights practices are less likely to comply with human
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4.2. Categorizing Levels of Enforcement Mechanisms in International
Human Rights Treaties
I test the credible threat theory empirically using the six main
international human rights treaties (together with their articles and
optional protocols), as well as the ICC treaty. Below, I first
describe the five different levels of enforcement mechanisms found
in those treaties. I then categorize the different treaties, articles,
and optional protocols used in this study according to those five
different levels.
Most international human rights treaties are characterized by
“soft law” enforcement mechanisms.68 While many provide for an
independent body to oversee compliance and enforcement, most
do not grant those independent bodies—typically committees—
any legally binding authority to punish bad and noncompliant
behavior. The six main international human rights treaties contain
what I characterize as the very weakest enforcement mechanisms:
they only require the state to submit regular reports to a committee
about the state’s efforts to comply with treaty terms. Self-reporting
requirements are particularly weak enforcement mechanisms
because they lack clear and precise obligations, and moreover, the
body to which states have delegated authority to consider the
reports has no power to absolutely compel reports—or, for that
matter, better domestic human rights practices. Indeed, as Jack
Donnelly notes, the committees cannot even ensure that the
required reports are submitted on time.69 Furthermore, by filing
even a pro forma report, the state will have formally discharged its
reporting requirement since “whatever the quality of the report,
once it has been reviewed, the monitoring process typically ends
until the next report is due, in five years.”70 Donnelly further
explains that while reporting procedures are useful in that they
provide a concrete reminder for states to review their practices,
those procedures cannot be used to force recalcitrant states into
actually improving their practices.71
rights treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms and are more likely to
comply with treaties with “toothless” enforcement mechanisms).
68 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 62, at 422–24 (noting that the majority of
international laws are deemed “soft law” and explaining the justifications and
benefits of using soft law enforcement mechanisms in international law).
69 DONNELLY, supra note 26, at 85.
70 Id. (discussing the Human Rights Committee).
71 Id. at 87.
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States can, however, agree to be bound by more onerous
enforcement mechanisms beyond simply state-reporting. First,
states can agree on a committee’s competence to hear complaints
by other states claiming that they are not living up to their
On paper, this enforcement
obligations under the treaty.72
mechanism appears stronger than the self-reporting requirement
since it at least requires state parties to submit to a grievance
procedure before an independent committee. Nevertheless, it
bears noting that in the present system, committees are not
empowered to order a remedy for any violations they find: if the
matter cannot be resolved via negotiation, the committee is
generally limited to summarizing its activities in a report.73
In addition, some treaties allow states to agree on a
committee’s competence to receive and consider complaints by
individuals alleging that their rights under the treaty have been
violated—if the individuals have, among other things, exhausted
available domestic remedies.74 The individual complaints are
heard by a committee empowered to consider evidence and issue
decisions. In some cases, the committee may also invite the state
party to submit written responses to the views stated in the
committee’s decision and to comment on action taken as a result.75
However, even then, none of these optional procedures associated
with the six main international human rights treaties grants to the
committee any powers to issue legally binding decisions. Instead,
committee powers are essentially limited to encouraging
72 For example, under Article 41 of the ICCPR, states may authorize the
Human Rights Committee to hear interstate complaints, but only if both state
parties have formally acknowledged the Committee’s competence to receive and
consider inter-state communications. The provisions of Article 21 of the CAT are
similar.
73 See, e.g., CAT Optional Protocol, supra note 28, art. 21(h) (instructing parties
to submit a report including a brief statement of the facts); ICCPR, supra note 6,
art. 41(h) (stating that the Committee shall limit its report to a brief statement of
the facts).
74 Several of the main international human rights treaties include articles or
optional protocols with this additional enforcement mechanism. See, e.g., CAT
Optional Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22 (stating that no claim shall be heard unless
competence of the committee is declared by the state); CEDAW Optional Protocol,
supra note 27 (authorizing the state to hear the claims brought if it deems the
committee competent); ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 27 (allowing
state to determine committee’s competence to hear claims); CERD, supra note 6,
art. 14 (authorizing the state to hear such claims only if it deems the committee
competent).
75 For example, in Article 7, the CEDAW Optional Protocol permits the
Committee to seek comments and reports on actions taken by states.
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Moreover,
compliance and issuing reports of its actions.76
according to the website for the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, as of August 2010, the procedures for interstate
complaints had never been used.77
Although there is not an enormous difference between the
latter two enforcement mechanisms in terms of the precision of
their requirements or the power of the committees, I conclude that
the individual complaint mechanism may be costlier for states for
several reasons. First, states should expect more individual
complaints than state complaints because individuals within a
state are more likely than other states to actually know of the
actual state’s human rights practices. Second there are also more
individuals in a state than there are other states. Finally, the
evidence suggests that states are not inclined to use the interstate
complaint procedure, a fact which later-ratifying states would
know when considering the strength of that enforcement
mechanism. By contrast, the various committees have received
and considered individual complaints and have rendered
decisions. Again, however, those decisions are not subject to
appeal, and if the committee decides in favor of the individual, it
cannot force a remedy: it is limited to inviting the state party to
show how it has resolved the issue.
Under the Optional Protocol to the CAT, states may commit to
a seemingly stronger enforcement mechanism. By that Optional
Protocol, states bind themselves to recognize the competence of a
Subcommittee on Prevention to regularly visit any place under its
jurisdiction and control where persons are held in detention by the
government or with its acquiescence.78 The visits are undertaken
in an effort to strengthen, if necessary, the detainees’ rights to be
protected against torture and other cruel and inhumane
punishment.79 In connection with the visits, parties agree to
76 See, e.g., CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 7, 12 (describing
the committee’s powers as essentially overseeing compliance and issuing reports
on its actions); ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 5, 6 (stating that
the role of the committee shall not exceed reporting on its actions and monitoring
compliance).
77 See Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Petitions, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
petitions/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (stating that although state parties
are permitted to complain to the relevant treaty body about alleged violations by
other states, no state has ever done so).
78 CAT Optional Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 4, 11.
79 Id. art. 4.
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provide all relevant information to the Subcommittee, as well as
access to private interviews of detainees—without the presence of
witnesses.80
Pursuant to Article 16, the Subcommittee is
authorized to publish reports of its investigations, together with
any comments the state party may wish to include.81 In the event
the state party does not cooperate with the Subcommittee and does
not authorize access to information and interviews, or refuses to
take steps to improve a situation identified by the Subcommittee,
the Subcommittee may—after the state party has had an
opportunity to make its views known—make a public statement
concerning the matter or publish a report about it.82
The committee with oversight of the CAT Optional Protocol,
like the other committees, is generally limited at the conclusion of
its investigation to encouraging compliance and making comments
or reports. I suggest, though, that the enforcement mechanism
associated with the CAT Optional Protocol is stronger than those
described above because it requires states to allow an independent
body onto sovereign territory and to grant access to citizenry or
other prisoners under state control. While all states will not
necessarily comply with that requirement, sidestepping the
requirement is certainly not as easy as filing a pro forma report.
Furthermore, neither the interstate nor individual complaint
procedures purport to bind the state parties to allowing a
committee to visit the territory and conduct its own investigation
of the facts.
On the other hand, in none of the above instances have states
delegated to an independent body the power to make legally
binding decisions. Thus, even the strongest of these enforcement
mechanisms giving committees powers to monitor compliance
may not be very “strong.” Of course, even if they are not “strong”
enforcement mechanisms, they may still help prompt states to
improve their respect for individual human rights. For example,
the reports, decisions, and comments by the committees may
shame states into improving their domestic policies and practices.
Those reports, decisions, and comments can also be accessed by
states, NGOs, and domestic civil society and similarly used by any
of them to shame states into complying with international human
rights norms. Regarding the level of the enforcement mechanisms
80
81
82

Id. arts. 12, 14.
Id. art. 16.
Id.
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to which states bind themselves pursuant to the treaty’s terms,
however, the fact remains that the committees do not have legally
binding adjudicatory power with resources to compel compliance
and punish bad and noncompliant behavior.
Rather, of the fourteen treaties, articles, or protocols in this
study, the ICC treaty can best be characterized as having relatively
strong “hard law” enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, the ICC
treaty is unlike any international human rights treaty that has gone
before it. Pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Rome
Statute, states have designated to an independent entity the
authority to determine whether there is evidence to believe an
individual or group committed one of the covered crimes within
the territory of a State Party. In addition, they have delegated the
power to determine whether the state which would otherwise have
jurisdiction over the matter is itself either unwilling or unable to
prosecute the wrongdoers. And, by committing to the treaty
creating the ICC, states agree that such investigations may be
commenced against the state’s own nationals for the covered
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, as
long as those crimes were committed after the Court came into
existence or after the state ratified the treaty, whichever is later.
Furthermore, unlike the committees associated with the other
international human rights treaties, the ICC does control resources
that can be used to prevent abuses or to punish offenders.
For example, the ICC may issue arrest warrants to bring
individuals or groups to stand trial for their crimes before judges at
the ICC in The Hague. And, states and individuals have
responded to the ICC’s power of arrest. Some states have
cooperated in bringing suspects to The Hague for trial.83 Other

83 Belgian authorities arrested the former Vice-President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo—who was the subject of a sealed arrest warrant—during
his visit to the country. Agence France-Presse, Congo Ex-Official Is Held In Belgium
on War Crimes Charges, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/05/25/world/africa/25congo.html?ref=africa. In November 2011, Ivory
Coast authorities surrendered Laurent Gbagbo pursuant to an ICC arrest warrant
in connection with an investigation into the situation in the Ivory Coast opened by
the ICC wherein Mr. Gbagbo is charged with allegedly committing mass atrocities
in the aftermath of the country’s presidential elections in 2010. Press Release, Int’l
Criminal Court [ICC], New Suspect in the ICC’s Custody: Laurent Gbagbo
Arrived at the Detention Centre, ICC-CPI-20111130-PR747 (Nov. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/4814FA54-AF2D-4EA3-8A899E809318D1D8.htm.
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suspects have voluntarily appeared in The Hague in order to avoid
having warrants issued for their arrest.84
Of course, notwithstanding these powers to effectuate arrests
and prosecute those who commit mass atrocities, some suspects
may initially escape justice. The ICC has informed the United
Nations Security Council of the failure of ICC States Parties
Djibouti, Chad, Kenya, and Malawi to execute on the ICC’s
warrant for the arrest of President Omar Bashir of Sudan during
his visits to these countries.85 Nevertheless, the power delegated to
the ICC is still of a legally binding nature. Suspects may be able to
escape arrest by staying in-state, hiding, or visiting only friendly
states (and suspects can always escape arrest in similar ways even
under domestic criminal law systems where police forces can
effectuate arrests). But, those suspects are not completely free to
do as they please, as President Bashir no doubt knows. Malawi’s
new President, Joyce Banda, publicly announced in June 2012 that
her country would not host an African Union summit if she was
obligated to invite Bashir as head of an AU member state, noting
how strained ties with key donors in the international community
became after her predecessor allowed Bashir to visit.86
84 Press Release, ICC, As Darfur Rebel Commanders Surrender to the Court,
ICC Prosecutor “welcomes compliance with the Court’s decisions and with
Resolution 1593 (2005) of the Security Council,” ICC-OTP-20100616-PR548 (June
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%
20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/
icc02050309/press%20release/pr548 (addressing the arrival of two Darfur rebel
commanders to answer charges and face prosecution for their conduct); Kenya: Q
& A on Pre-Trial Hearing in First ICC Case, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/kenya-qa-pre-trial-hearing-first-icccase (noting that six Kenyans charged with committing mass atrocities in the
aftermath of the country’s 2007 presidential elections voluntarily appeared in The
Hague to face charges pursuant to a summons to appear).
85 Press Release, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I informs the United Nations
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties About Chad’s Noncooperation in the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, ICC-CPI-20111213PR756 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/
situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%
20cases/icc02050109/press%20releases/pre_trial%20chamber%20i%20informs%
20the%20united%20nations%20security%20council%20and%20the%20assembly%
20of%20states%20parties%20a.
86 See Malawi Cancels AU Summit Hosting Over Sudan’s Leader Invite, RADIO
NETH. WORLDWIDE (June 8, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/article/malawi-cancels-au-summit-hosting-over-sudans-leader-invite
(“Malawi’s new president, Joyce Banda, said in May that she wanted Bashir to
stay away from the [AU] summit . . . to avoid straining ties with key donors for
her impoverished country.”).
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Furthermore, although the fact of the arrest warrant may actually
provoke some suspects to engage in additional abuses or
repressive behavior in order to fight against the ICC’s authority, in
many ways this only demonstrates the strength of the ICC’s
enforcement mechanism.
Accordingly, I argue that the
enforcement mechanisms in the fourteen different treaties that are
the subject of this study can be arranged from weakest to strongest
as follows: (1) the state agrees to a self-reporting requirement; (2)
the state recognizes committee competence to hear state
complaints; (3) the state recognizes committee competence to hear
individual complaints; (4) the state agrees to permit committee
visits to its territory to engage in investigations; and (5) the state
agrees to authorize an independent body to prosecute its
government or citizenry for human rights crimes. Table 2 lists the
fourteen treaties, articles, or protocols (together with the year they
were available for ratification), and organizes them by their
associated levels of enforcement mechanisms.
Table 2: Fourteen Human Rights Treaties and Levels of
Enforcement Mechanisms
Level of
Enforcement

Description of Mechanism

1-weakest

State must file reports

2-weak

States make complaints to
committee
Individuals file complaints
with committee

3-moderate

4-stronger
5-strongest

Committee may visit state
Independent prosecutor
investigations

5.

Human Rights Treaty

ICCPR (1966); ICESCR (1966);
CERD (1966); CEDAW (1980);
CAT (1984); CRC (1989)
Article 41 ICCPR (1966);
Article 21 CAT (1984)
Optional Protocol ICCPR
(1966); Article 14 CERD
(1966); Article 22 CAT (1984);
Optional Protocol CEDAW
(1999)
Optional Protocol CAT (2003)
ICC (1998)

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study tests the credible threat theory quantitatively and
pits that theory against the credible commitment theory and the
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external pressures theories described in Section 3 above.
According to the credible threat theory, states will be more likely to
ratify international human rights treaties with relatively strong
enforcement mechanisms if their rational and backward looking
cost calculations suggest commitment will not result in a
significant loss of sovereignty.87 If the theory is correct, the
statistical evidence should show that states with poor human
rights practices will be just as likely as states with good human
rights practices to readily ratify international human rights treaties
containing the weakest enforcement mechanisms. States with
poorer records, however, should be much less likely to ratify
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms that can be used to
punish bad and noncompliant behavior. Regarding in particular
the treaty creating the ICC, the evidence should show that states
with poorer human rights practices—namely, the states that are
least likely to be able to comply with treaty terms and avoid being
subjected to the treaty’s relatively strong enforcement
mechanisms—will refuse to join the Court.
The predictions of the credible commitment and the external
pressures theories are in stark contrast to those of the credible
threat theory. Those theories predict that even where enforcement
mechanisms are stronger, states that may not be able to readily
comply with treaty terms will still ratify.88 According to the
credible commitment theory, in fact, where enforcement
mechanisms are strongest—as they are in the ICC treaty—states
with poor records and that are also non-democracies will join the
Court in order to signal to their domestic audiences their intention
to be better in the future. According to pressure theories, even
states with poor past and present human rights practices will
commit to treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms because
they are directly or indirectly pressured to join in order to obtain
some extra-treaty benefits such as increased aid or trade.
5.1. Methodology
I use event history analysis89—specifically, a Cox proportionalhazards model—to test the explanatory power of the credible
threat theory and to test it against the credible commitment and
external pressures theories.
Event history analysis is an
87
88
89

See supra Section 4.
See supra Sections 3.1.2.2.1, 3.2
Event history analysis is also called “survival” analysis.
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appropriate methodology to use to examine state commitment to
the various international human rights treaties in this study
because it allows the researcher to incorporate both constant and
time-varying factors into the quantitative model.90 For example,
the researcher can include in the model data that varies over time,
such as a state’s yearly human rights and democracy ratings. The
researcher can also include data that does not vary year-to-year,
such as whether the state follows a common law or civil law legal
tradition.
Event history models test each state’s “time until” the event of
treaty ratification and what factors speed up or slow down that
time line to commitment. I examine state commitment to each of
the fourteen different treaties in this study using separate, but
parallel, analyses. Appendix A lists the fourteen different treaties
and shows the states that are parties to each.
5.2. Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in the study are the time to ratification
of each of the fourteen different international human rights
treaties. Ratification data on the fourteen different international
human rights treaties were coded from the United Nations. The
data is assembled at yearly intervals for more than 190 countries
between 1966 and 2008. Countries existing at the time the treaty
was adopted and available for ratification in that year are “at risk”
of ratifying during that year. Countries established after the treaty
was available for ratification enter the risk set upon
independence—the year when they are eligible to ratify as a
sovereign state. Countries at risk are given a value of 0 until such
time as they ratify the instrument in question. At the time of
ratification—when the event happens—countries are assigned a
value of 1. Countries that did not ratify by 2008, when the
observation period here ends, are right-censored since the event for
them never happened, but can still happen.
5.3. The Main Explanatory Variable: Level of Human Rights Practices
While each treaty does have its own terms and particular rights
that it is designed to protect, all have in common that they are
90 For a comprehensive description of event history analysis, see, for
example, PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR
LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984); EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS WITH STATA (HansPeter Blossfeld et al. eds., 2007).
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designed to require states and their leaders to promote better
domestic human rights practices and protect against and punish
any human rights abuses. Therefore, in order to consistently test
commitment across the various treaties, I use one main explanatory
variable to measure the state’s ability to comply with treaty terms.
In this case, that measure is the level of the state’s human rights
practices. Since the treaties in this study by their terms all require
states to adhere to good human rights practices, compliance should
be easiest and less costly for those states with policies and practices
that are consistent with treaty terms. By contrast, states with bad
past and present human rights practices should calculate that
compliance would be difficult and also potentially quite costly if
the treaty has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.
To measure a state’s level of human rights practices, I use the
Political Terror Scale, which is a generally-recognized human
rights measure obtained from human rights reports issued by
Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State. The
reports assign country scores by considering the presence of
government practices that include murder, torture, forced
disappearances, and political imprisonment. The scale ranges from
1 to 5, where 1 corresponds with torture and political
imprisonments occurring only rarely and the country generally
protecting human rights.91 Thus, states assigned a 1 will have the
best human rights practices using this scale, and states assigned a 5
will have the worst practices. When possible, I average the two
scores reported.92 Data on these human rights practices are
available beginning in 1976 and are reported from each year
91 I chose not to include in my model a measure of “recent civil wars” as did
Simmons and Danner because, as previously noted, I do not believe that measure
best captures the concept of the level of a state’s human rights practices or the
likelihood that it will commit a mass atrocity. See supra note 53. On the other
hand, the political terror data on human rights practices directly measures a
state’s tendency to commit the kinds of human rights violations that cause it to
run afoul of the terms of the various international human rights treaties described
above, as well as subject the state’s leaders and citizens to an ICC prosecution.
92 Averaging the scores should help mitigate any bias from using only scores
based on Amnesty International or the U.S. State Department reports. In any
event, scholars have found that over time, the similarity between the reports of
the two entities has increased. See Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human
Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years
1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291, 301–02 (1999) (arguing that selection bias of
Amnesty International and U.S. Department of State personal integrity abuse
measures can be “addressed by substitution” and that these measures eventually
converge to be “virtually identical”).
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thereafter until 2008. Similar to Cole,93 for the period between 1966
and 1976 (a time period relevant to the examination of several of
the treaties), I extrapolate missing data points using a state’s
median score over the period from 1976 to 1984 if data is
available.94 Again, because each of the treaties being tested is
designed to ensure that states promote better human rights
practices and protect against, and punish, human rights abuses, the
data should adequately measure a state’s tendency to have in place
policies and practices that would enable it to comply with these
treaties.
5.4. Control Variables
I also include several control variables in the model to account
for the various other theories that scholars have advanced to
explain state commitment to international human rights treaties
(outlined in Section 3 above). I describe each of these control
variables briefly below. Appendix B describes in more detail the
nature and source of the data used to measure the control
variables.

93 See Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Missing data points between 1966 and 1974
are extrapolated from a country’s median score over the period 1975–1999.”).
94 I considered using the physical integrity rights measure reported in the
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset. That measure also ranks a state’s
respect for human rights based on data from Amnesty International and U.S. State
Department reports addressing tortures, extrajudicial killings, political
imprisonments, and disappearances. The physical integrity rating is specified on
a 0 to 8 scale, with 8 representing full governmental respect for physical rights.
However, the Cingranelli-Richards data is only available beginning in 1981,
making it not as comprehensive for these purposes as the data available from the
Political Terror Scale, which begins in 1976. Compare The CIRI Human Rights Data
Project, CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp
(last revised Jan. 14 2012) with The Political Terror Scale Online, POLITICAL TERROR
SCALE, www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (last updated Nov. 3, 2012).
Furthermore, the other studies that compare ratification decisions across
international human rights treaties beginning in 1966 also use the Political Terror
Scale to measure a state’s human rights practices. See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra
note 22, at 743 (describing variables used in analyzing international human rights
treaties from 1965 to 2001); Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Using data collected from
annual human rights reports issued by Amnesty International and the U.S.
Department of State, countries are assigned a score of 1 to 5 on an ordinal scale . . .
.”). Thus, a comparison to the results of those studies is better facilitated by using
the same measure here.
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5.4.1. The Rationalist View
To test the idea that democracies are more likely than
autocracies to ratify international human rights treaties, I include a
measure of democracy taken from the Polity IV Project.
I use a state’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita as a
measure of economic development to test the hypothesis that more
economically developed states are more likely than less developed
states to join international human rights treaties. GDP per capita is
a standard control variable in cross-national research and is used
as a proxy for a country’s general level of economic development.95
To measure the political costs associated with a state’s domestic
legislative treaty ratification process, I use Simmons’ data, which
codes ratification processes using a four-category scale according
to the difficulty of the processes.96
To test the future domestic uncertainty costs theory and the
idea that states following a common law tradition are less likely to
ratify international human rights institutions than those following
a civil law tradition, I include data on whether a state follows a
common law legal tradition.
Finally, I include a control variable to measure the new
democracy, democratic “lock-in” theory advanced by Andrew
Moravcsik using a dummy variable derived from the Polity IV
democracy measure.
5.4.2. The External Pressures View
Regarding external pressures that may influence state
ratification behavior, I first include a measure to account for the
idea that less developed states may ratify treaties so as to receive
extra-treaty benefits from more powerful and wealthier nations.
95 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 83–84 tbl.3.1 (using log of GDP per capita
and log of GDP by size as explanatory variables in evaluating ratification of
human rights treaties); Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, a standard control variable in cross-national research, proxies a
country’s general level of economic development.”); Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra
note 22, at 737 (averring that “level of economic development is a key factor
shaping governments’ decision to ratify treaties”).
96 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, app. I at 383 (defining the ratification process
according to four categories capturing the degree of political difficulty in the
formal process of ratification including (1) ratification by an individual chief
executive or cabinet decision, (2) a rule of informing the legislative body of signed
treaties, (3) majority consent of one legislative body, and (4) a supermajority in
one legislative body or a majority in two legislative bodies).
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Like Simmons, I measure this concept using net official
development assistance and official aid (“ODA”).97 ODA consists
of the loans and grants made to developing countries.
Last, I measure the concept concerning regional influence by
looking at regional density of the ratification of the various treaties,
articles, and optional protocols. Regional density computes
ratification by countries in the same region (using seven World
Bank categories) up to the previous year.98
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the independent
variables described above and used to test commitment to all
fourteen international human rights treaties, articles, or optional
protocols included in this study.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Common Independent Variables
Variable
Level of Human
Rights
Level of Democracy
Level of Economic
Development
Difficulty of
Domestic Treaty
Ratification Process
Common Law State
or Not
Transitioning
Democracy or Not
Level of Aid or
Assistance

2.39

Standard
Deviation
1.09

Min.
Value
1

Max.
Value
5

6498
7015

4
7.52

4.18
1.56

0
4.13

10
11.26

4834

1.57

.65

1

3

8481

.34

.47

0

1

6794

.17

.38

0

1

7059

.09

.16

-.03

2.68

Observations

Mean

6597

97 See id. app. I at 385 (defining ODA using World Bank data measuring
official development assistance and official aid, denominated in U.S. dollars, as a
share of GDP).
98 The seven World Bank regions are: Sub-Saharan Africa; East Asia/Oceania;
Eastern Europe/Central Asia; Latin America/Caribbean; Middle East/North
Africa; South Asia; and the West (Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States). See Countries and Regions, WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,
pagePK:180619~theSitePK:136917,00.html.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

An examination of state ratification patterns provides
contextual background helpful to understanding the results of the
event history analysis and also provides preliminary support for
the idea that states view strong enforcement mechanisms as a
credible threat. Table 4 contains a list of the fourteen different
international human rights treaties that are the subject of this study
and shows that states with worse human rights practices are
almost just as likely as states with better human rights practices to
ratify international human rights treaties with the weakest
enforcement mechanisms.
However, where enforcement
mechanisms are stronger, states with worse human rights practices
are much more likely to avoid commitment.
Table 4: Ratification of the Fourteen Different Treaties Based on
Human Rights Ratings99
Treaty
ICCPR
ICESCR
CERD
CEDAW
CAT
CRC
ICCPR Art. 41
CAT Art. 21
ICCPR Optional
CERD Art. 14
CAT Art. 22
CEDAW Optional
CAT Optional
ICC

Total #
Ratified100
157
154
162
171
139
174
47
56
96
47
60
89
41
98

# Ratified with Better
Human Rights
83
80
86
95
73
95
31
39
60
31
37
57
29
66

# Ratified with Worse
Human Rights
74
74
76
76
66
79
16
17
36
16
23
32
12
32

99 I classified states with average human rights ratings of 2.5 and below
during the relevant time periods at which the various treaties could be ratified as
having better human rights practices. I classified states with average human
rights ratings above 2.5 during the relevant time periods as having poorer human
rights practices.
100 I obtained the total number of ratifying states from the data which ends in
2008. For each treaty, the total possible number of states that could have ratified
was 178 since those were the states for which human rights data was available.
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In fact, where the treaties contain only the weakest selfreporting mechanisms (the first six treaties listed), Table 4 shows
that the number of states with better and worse ratings ratifying
the treaty is close to equal.
By contrast, as enforcement
mechanisms strengthen, states with poorer human rights practices
tend to account for only about thirty percent of the ratifying
population. The figure below illustrates these ratification patterns.
Figure 1: Ratification of the Fourteen Different Treaties Based on
Average Human Rights Ratings

Examining the ratification patterns of states with the poorest
human rights ratings101 provides additional support for the
credible threat theory. Table 5 shows ratification behavior as it
relates to the six main international human rights treaties and the
ICC treaty. The evidence indicates that states with the poorest
human rights practices readily and regularly commit to
international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement
mechanisms. However, states with the poorest practices less
readily commit to the ICC treaty.
101 States with the poorest ratings are those that consistently averaged above
2.5 on the political terror scale (which ranges from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the
worst practices) during each of the five time periods relevant to the seven treaties.
Those time periods are 1965–2008 (ICCPR, ICESCR, and CERD); 1979–2008
(CEDAW); 1983–2008 (CAT); 1988–2008 (CRC); and 1997–2008 (ICC).
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Table 5: Poorest Human Rights Countries and Ratifications
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Bangladesh
Brazil
Burundi
Cambodia

ICC
2003
2003
—
2001
2010
2002
2004
2002

CCPR
1983
1991
1989
2006
2000
1992
1990
1992

CESCR
1983
1991
1989
—
1998
1992
1990
1992

CERD
1983
1994
1972
2006
1979
1968
1977
1983

CEDAW
2003
1994
1996
1997
1984
1984
1992
1992

CAT
1987
1994
1989
2006
1998
1989
1993
1992

CRC
1994
1992
1993
1996
1990
1990
1990
1992

Cameroon
Central Afr.
Rep.
Chad
China
Colombia
Congo (Brazza)
DRC (Kinshasa)
Cuba
Egypt
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Georgia
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Kenya
North Korea
Lebanon
Liberia

—
2001

1984
1981

1984
1981

1970
1971

1994
1991

1986
—

1993
1992

2006
—
2002
2004
2002
—
—
—

1995
—
1969
1983
1976
—
1982
1987

1995
2001
1969
1983
1976
—
1982
1987

1977
1981
1981
1988
1976
1972
1967
2002

1995
1980
1982
1982
1986
1980
1981
1984

1995
1988
1987
2003
1996
1995
1986
2002

1990
1992
1991
1993
1990
1991
1990
1992

—
—
2003
—
2003
—
2002
—
—
—
—
—
2005
—
—
2004

2002
1993
1994
1992
1978
1991
1997
1979
2006
1975
1971
1991
1972
1981
1972
2004

2001
1993
1994
1988
1978
—
1981
1979
2006
1975
1971
1991
1972
1981
1972
2004

2001
1976
1999
1983
1977
1972
2002
1968
1999
1968
1970
1979
2001
—
1971
1976

1995
1981
1994
1982
1982
1981
1983
1993
1984
—
1986
1991
1984
2001
1997
1984

—
1994
1994
1990
1989
—
1996
—
1998
—
—
1991
1997
—
2000
2004

1994
1991
1994
1990
1990
1995
1990
1992
1990
1994
1994
1991
1990
1990
1991
1993
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Libya
Morocco
Mozambique

—
—
—

1970
1979
1993

1970
1979
—

1968
1970
1983

1989
1993
1997

1989
1993
1999

1993
1993
1994

Mexico
Myanmar
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

2005
—
2001
—
—

1981
—
1993
—
2008

1981
—
1993
2009
2008

1975
—
1967
1966
1982

1981
1997
1985
1996
1995

1986
—
2001
—
—

1990
1991
1991
1990
1993

2001
2001
—
—
—
—
2000
—
2000
—
—
—
2000
—
—
—
—
2002
—
—
2000
—
2002
—

1992
1978
1986
1973
1975
—
1996
1990
1998
1980
1986
1969
1999
1996
1984
1969
2003
1995
1973
1995
1978
1987
1984
1991

1992
1978
1974
1973
1975
—
1996
1990
—
1980
1986
1969
1991
1999
1984
1969
2003
1987
1973
1995
1978
1987
1984
1991

2003
1971
1967
1969
1975
1997
1967
1975
1998
1982
1977
1969
1995
2003
1972
1967
2002
1980
1969
1995
1967
1972
1972
1991

1987
1982
1981
1981
1981
2000
1988
—
1995
1981
—
2003
1993
1985
1983
1985
1985
1985
1981
1995
1983
1984
1985
1991

1990
1988
1986
1987
2008
1997
2001
1990
1998
1994
—
2004
1995
2007
1987
1988
1988
1986
1987
1995
1991
1991
1998
—

1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1996
1990
—
1995
1991
1990
1993
1993
1992
1990
1992
1995
1990
1991
1994
1990
1991
1991
1990

Specifically, of the sixty-six countries with the poorest human
rights ratings, sixty-five (all except Myanmar) ratified at least four
of the six main international human rights treaties. All but
eighteen ratified all six treaties. By contrast, thirty-nine of the
sixty-six countries with the poorest ratings did not ratify the ICC
treaty. Among the thirty-nine countries that did not ratify the ICC
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treaty, some twenty-three nevertheless ratified all six main
international human rights treaties—the treaties with the weakest
enforcement mechanisms.102
In sum, an examination of state ratification patterns provides
support for the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.
The evidence shows that for the most part, states with poorer
human rights practices are regularly joining treaties with the
weakest enforcement mechanisms. They are doing so even though
their past and present human rights ratings indicate they likely
cannot comply with treaty terms and promote better domestic
human rights practices and protect against, and punish, abuses. Of
course, by committing to these treaties with the weakest
enforcement mechanisms, states likely know they cannot be
punished for bad and noncompliant behavior. On the other hand,
those same states are less regularly committing to treaties with
stronger enforcement mechanisms, including the treaty creating
the ICC. Contrary to the predictions of the credible commitment
theory and the external pressures theories, states with worse
practices do not seem to be committing overwhelmingly to treaties
with stronger enforcement mechanisms that can be used to punish
bad and noncompliant behavior. Instead, consistent with the
credible threat theory, it seems that these states with poor practices
are for the most part looking backwards and rationally calculating
compliance costs before committing to treaties with which they
cannot presently comply and that have enforcement mechanisms
that can be used to hold them to their commitment.
The results of event history analysis also provide support for
the idea that states view strong enforcement mechanisms as a
credible threat and more readily commit to treaties with stronger
enforcement mechanisms only where they are also willing and able
to comply with treaty terms. Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 present the
results from event history analysis for ratification of the various
international human rights treaties. The separate but parallel
analyses for the fourteen different international human rights
treaties are shown based on their associated level of enforcement
mechanisms. The results are reported as hazard ratios, which
102 Results were consistent for countries that scored even higher on the
political terror scale. For countries that consistently averaged above 2.8 during all
relevant time periods, twenty-nine of forty-three did not ratify the ICC. However,
all but Myanmar ratified at least four of the six main international human rights
treaties. And, seventeen of the twenty-nine that did not ratify the ICC treaty
nevertheless ratified all six of the main treaties.
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indicate the particular factor’s proportionate influence on the
decision to ratify. Numbers greater than one indicate an increase
in the hazard rate of ratification. Numbers less than one indicate a
decrease in the hazard rate.
As Table 6 shows, where enforcement mechanisms are weakest
and require only self-reporting, the results show no statistically
significant correlation between a state’s level of human rights
practices and state ratification behavior. This finding is consistent
with Cole’s regarding state commitment to the ICCPR and
ICESCR—the two main international human rights treaties he
examined in his study testing state ratification behavior.103 Indeed,
where enforcement mechanisms are weakest, the primary
explanatory variable—a state’s level of human rights practices—is
not a significant predictor of ratification in the tests for any of these
treaties. Thus, just as the evidence depicted in Table 4 indicates,
states with poorer human rights practices seem to be just as likely
as states with better practices to join international human rights
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms that cannot be used to
punish bad and noncompliant behavior. For states with better
practices, of course, whether enforcement mechanisms are weak
may not be a deciding factor in ratification calculations since the
state already has policies and practices in place that should not
cause it to run afoul of treaty terms. But, states with worse
practices can decide to commit to treaties with these weakest
enforcement mechanisms even if they have no ability or intent to
comply with treaty terms or better their practices because the
treaty is too toothless to compel compliance.

103 See Cole, supra note 22, at 483 (analyzing the correlation of various factors
with the likelihood of ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR and finding no
significant trend with respect to human rights practices). On the other hand,
Wotipka and Tsutsui found that states’ human rights practices were significantly
and negatively related to their tendency to ratify the six main human rights
treaties. See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 744–47 (“The effects of . . .
human rights practice indicate[s] that . . . rights-violating governments are more
likely to ratify human rights treaties in a given year, all else being equal.”).
However, those scholars did not separately test commitment to each of the human
rights treaties as I do—and as Cole did for the two main treaties in his study.
Rather, in Wotipka and Tsutsui’s study the event examined was whether a state
ratified any one of seven human rights treaties in a given year between 1965 and
2001. See id., at 739.
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Table 6: Level 1 Enforcement Mechanisms: State Reporting
Explanatory
Variables
Level of Human
Rights
Level of
Democracy
Level of Economic
Development
Difficulty of
Ratification
Process
Common Law or
Not
Transitioning
Democracy or Not
Level of Aid
Regional
Ratifications
# of Countries
# of Ratifications
# of Observations

Hazard Ratios
CCPR
1.024

CESCR
.903

CERD
.827

CEDAW
1.066

CAT
.917

CRC
.961

1.20***

1.20***

1.030

1.107**

1.043

1.109**

.737**

.680***

.938

.773

1.119

.620***

.792

.489***

.547**

.837

.849

.702

.603

.287***

.576

.412***

.340***

.438***

.389

.296**

1.079

.892

.986

.917

.132
13.0***

.042
7.93***

.178
5.682**

.023**
1.28

.096
6.35***

.405
.647

74
57
1051

73
55
1056

57
51
610

69
65
491

107
80
1003

82
81
213

**significant at .05; ***significant at .01
In fact, state ratification behavior as to these six main
international human rights treaties appears somewhat
indiscriminate since the results indicate no factor is consistently
correlated with ratification. Of the factors that are significant
predictors of ratification behavior for more than one of the six main
treaties, the hazard ratios for the democracy, difficulty of
ratification process, common law, and regional indicators are in the
predicted direction. Democracies are more likely than autocracies
to quickly ratify each of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, and CRC.
States with more difficult ratification procedures are less likely to
ratify the ICESCR and CERD. Common law states are less likely to
commit to the ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC. Regional
ratification patterns positively influence ratification of the ICCPR,
ICESCR, CERD, and CAT. But, while these various factors did
influence commitment in some cases, their influence was not in
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any way uniform across these treaties with the same enforcement
mechanism. Only ratification of the ICESCR is significantly
influenced by all four of these factors.
In sum, ratification of the main treaties does not seem to be
influenced by any one factor, and the main compliance cost
variable—a state’s level of human rights practices—is not a
significant predictor of ratification behavior in these cases where
enforcement mechanisms are weakest. Instead, and as shown in
Table 4, states with poorer human rights practices seem to be
readily and regularly joining these treaties with the weakest
enforcement mechanisms despite the fact that they may be unable
or unwilling to comply with the treaty’s terms and goals. But,
since the treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are too weak to punish
bad and noncompliant behavior, these “bad” states can join with
no risk to their sovereignty and as window dressing only.104
The results of the tests of the treaties grouped in Enforcement
Level 2 (interstate complaints) also lend support to the credible
threat theory. The results reported in Table 7 show that better
human rights practices did not significantly and positively predict
state ratification of either Article 41 of the ICCPR or Article 21 of
the CAT.
In those models, only democracy and regional
ratifications are significant and then only with respect to
ratification of CAT Article 21. Otherwise, none of the other
indicators are significant predictors of ratification behavior,
suggesting that state decisions to ratify may not be based on a
rational costs and benefits analysis when enforcement mechanisms
are still relatively weak. Indeed, the treaty terms associated with
the treaties grouped in Enforcement Level 2 make clear that
committee power will be limited to trying to negotiate a resolution
to any interstate complaints. Moreover, it seems the interstate
complaint practice is not really used in any event—a fact that states
ratifying the treaty likely knew when they decided to bind
themselves to this mechanism. For example, twenty-six of the
forty-eight states that have ratified Article 41 of the ICCPR did not
do so until 1990 or after (even though many could have ratified

104 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 5, at 1378 (noting that
mechanisms for treaty enforcement are often weak, which encourages ratification
because states obtain the benefit of having signed onto the treaty while at the
same time might avoid the consequences of any non-compliant behavior).
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beginning in 1966)—by which time states likely realized the
provision for interstate complaints was not being invoked.105
Table 7: Level 2 Enforcement Mechanisms: Interstate Complaints
Explanatory Variables
Level of Human Rights
Level of Democracy
Level of Economic Development
Difficulty of Ratification Process
Common Law or Not
Transitioning Democracy or Not
Level of Aid
Regional Ratifications
# of Countries
# of Ratifications
# of Observations

Hazard Ratios
Art. 41 ICCPR
Art. 21 CAT
1.042
1.008
1.155
1.170**
1.245
1.585
.653
.734
1.632
.473
.707
1.220
.789
.120
14.775
8.368**
121
129
18
34
2594
1910

**significant at .05; ***significant at .01
In short, there is scant evidence that the costs of noncompliance
drive state decisions to commit to international human rights
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms. The measure for
human rights practices was not significant in any of the models
testing state ratification of treaties categorized as having Level 1
and Level 2 enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the evidence
shows that democracies were more likely to ratify only some of the
eight treaties grouped in Levels 1 and 2. Moreover, other factors
also influenced treaty ratification in some cases, and in some cases
those factors predicted ratification in ways that were contrary to
theory.
Conversely, where the enforcement mechanisms are strongest,
the empirical evidence suggests states engage in rational backward
looking calculations and consider compliance costs and their level
of human rights practices when making commitment decisions. As
Table 8 shows, a state’s level of human rights practices is a highly
significant predictor of ICC ratification, and states with the worst
human rights practices are much less likely to join the ICC. The
Thirty-four of the sixty states that have ratified Article 21 of the CAT
similarly did not do so until 1990 or after.
105
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hazard ratio of .523 indicates that states are about 50% less likely to
join the ICC with each unit decrease in their human rights
practices.106 The democracy indicator of compliance is also
significant for ICC treaty ratification, a fact which is consistent with
the credible threat theory since democracies also tend to follow the
rule of law, limit government power, and have the types of policies
and practices enabling them to comply with international human
rights treaties. With each unit improvement in its democracy
rating, a state is about 20% more likely to ratify the ICC. These
findings all support the credible threat theory: where enforcement
mechanisms are strongest, states most able to comply with the ICC
treaty requirements are also the most likely to ratify. Those less
able to comply—namely, those with the worst human rights
practices and non-democracies—are less likely to ratify.
Table 8: Level 5 Enforcement Mechanism: Independent
Prosecutor
Explanatory Variables
Level of Human Rights
Level of Democracy
Level of Economic Development
Difficulty of Ratification Process
Common Law or Not
Transitioning Democracy or Not
Level of Aid
Regional Ratifications
# of Countries
# of Ratifications
# of Observations

Hazard Ratios
International Criminal Court
.523***
1.230***
.743**
1.127
.939
.673
.134
7.389**
135
74
848

**significant at .05; ***significant at .01

106 As a robustness check, I also ran the Level 5 and Level 1 ratification
models using the Cingranelli-Richards measure for human rights practices. The
results similarly showed that states with better human rights practices were
significantly more likely than states with poor practices to commit to the ICC
(Level 5). In the models testing ratification of the human rights treaties with the
weakest enforcement mechanisms (Level 1), this measure of a state’s human
rights practices (like the Political Terror scale measure) was not a significant
predictor of state commitment.
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Accordingly, these findings regarding ICC commitment lend
support to the credible threat theory, but at the same time discredit
the explanatory power of the credible commitment theory and the
external pressures theories. In the case of the ICC, where
enforcement mechanisms are strongest, the evidence does not
suggest that non-democratic states or states with poor practices are
more likely to bind themselves to a treaty with which they cannot,
or will not, comply because they either want to tie their hands to
act better in the future or because they were pressured to signal
their commitment to international norms. As to the credible
commitment theory in particular, again, one might question why
an autocratic state that has declined to impose upon itself domestic
accountability mechanisms would willingly impose upon itself an
international accountability mechanism that could result in
government leaders being tried in The Hague. On the contrary, the
evidence suggests that, consistent with the credible threat theory,
states with poor human rights practices and non-democracies—the
very states that are likely to conclude that compliance with the ICC
may be difficult and, hence, costly to their sovereignty—will be
wary of joining the Court and will avoid its strong enforcement
mechanisms. And, indeed, one could expect that ICC commitment
would be most costly for this category of states since commitment
would entail a reduction of leaders’ power to rule domestically as
they see fit—even if that means using violence and refusing to
prosecute themselves or their compatriots who commit violent
acts.
Where enforcement mechanisms are in the middle range
(Enforcement Levels 3 and 4), however, results are mixed.
Supportive of the credible threat theory are the findings regarding
commitment to the ICCPR First Optional Protocol. As shown in
Table 9, and consistent with Cole’s findings,107 a state’s level of
human rights practices does significantly and positively predict
ratification of the ICCPR First Optional Protocol. In addition,
another indicator of potential compliance—namely, a state’s level
107 Cole tested the influence of enforcement mechanisms on ratification
decisions, but only as to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR First Optional
Protocol. He found that a state’s level of human rights ratings did not predict
ratification of the ICCPR (even as to Article 41 which allows state complaints) or
of the ICESCR. However, states with better human rights ratings were more
likely to join the ICCPR First Optional Protocol—a fact that Cole attributed to the
differing enforcement mechanisms between the main treaties and the Optional
Protocol. See Cole, supra note 21, at 485.
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of democracy—was also a significant and positive predictor of
state ratification of the ICCPR First Optional Protocol. On the
other hand, a state’s human rights ratings did not predict
ratification of the other three treaties allowing individual
complaints. Instead, the only compliance cost measure that
significantly predicted ratification of these three treaties was the
democracy measure. But, that measure only predicted ratification
of the CEDAW Optional Protocol.
Table 9: Level
Complaints

3

Enforcement

Explanatory Variables

Level of Human Rights
Level of Democracy
Level of Economic Development
Difficulty of Ratification Process
Common Law or Not
Transitioning Democracy or Not
Level of Aid
Regional Ratifications
# of Countries
# of Ratifications
# of Observations

Mechanisms:

Individual

Hazard Ratios
ICCPR
Opt.
Protocol
.630**
1.212***
.622***
.943
.325***
1.113
.056
1.010
102
50
1862

Art. 14
CERD

Art. 22
CAT

.813
1.156
.826
1.191
.236**
.885
1.62
17.867**
131
27
2766

1.129
1.137
1.335
.683
.217***
1.225
.001
9.400**
129
35
1922

CEDAW
Opt.
Protocol
.832
1.198***
.815
1.064
.554
.890
.007**
2.828
138
72
846

**significant at .05; ***significant at .01
In addition, as to this individual complaint enforcement
mechanism, there is some limited support for the explanatory
power of the normative and external pressures theories.
Specifically, regional ratification rates positively and significantly
influenced ratification of CERD Article 14 and CAT Article 22.
However, the findings on the effect of regional ratifications are not
consistent across all of the four treaties in this category.
Furthermore, the other relevant normative and external pressures
variable—level of aid—is not a significant predictor of ratification
of any of these treaties. Thus, on the whole, the empirical evidence
as to this level of enforcement mechanisms is rather inconclusive.
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On the other hand, another interpretation of these null results
as to Enforcement Level 3 is that states do not view the individual
complaint procedure as a very strong enforcement mechanism. If
the individual complaint mechanism poses no credible threat, then
states can commit without having to concern themselves with their
ability to comply—meaning that the state’s level of human rights
ratings need not be figured into the ratification calculation. After
all, the committees to whom these individual complaints are
referred do not have the ability to issue legally binding decisions.
Their powers are limited to persuading states to adopt their views
and recommended remedies. Furthermore, there is evidence that,
at least with regard to the CERD and the CEDAW, the individual
complaint procedure mechanism is of little significance in practice.
Jack Donnelly characterized the procedure for considering
individual complaints under the CERD as “largely moribund.” He
noted that the CEDAW committee had only issued three decisions
under the individual complaint procedure since it was empowered
to consider such complaints in 2000.108
The null findings regarding the CAT Optional Protocol
(Enforcement Level 4), which are reported in Table 10 below, may
be explained similarly. Compliance costs may not influence
ratification of the CAT Optional Protocol simply because states do
not view the treaty’s enforcement mechanism as a credible threat.
Like the other committees, the committee overseeing that treaty is
not empowered to act punitively or impose any sanctions for
noncompliance.109 Furthermore, as Henry Steiner notes regarding
the Human Rights Committee, it is unlikely to pose a great threat
to states as it thus far is able to consider only a small number of
communications,110 most of its decisions receive little publicity or
108 DONNELLY, supra note 26, at 87. Since 2005/6, when Donnelly was writing,
decisions have continued to trickle out of the CEDAW Committee. The handful of
Decisions and Views rendered by the Committee to date is available through the
United Nations website. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women—Jurisprudence, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
jurisprudence.htm (last visited Nov. 19. 2012).
109 See Steiner, supra note 31, at 37 (commenting that the ICCPR Committee’s
views are poor instruments to achieve greater protection of rights by all states due
in part to the lack of an accompanying enforcement mechanisms).
110 A 2009 report of the Human Rights Committee indicated that it had issued
forty-six decisions (and declared twenty-nine cases inadmissible) between
October 2008 and July 2009. See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. Vol. I, 94th
sess, Oct. 13–31, 2008, 95th sess, Mar. 16–Apr. 3, 2009, 96th sess, July 13–31, 2009,
iii, U.N. Doc. A/64/40; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2009).
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attention, and the suggested remedies—compensation, release of a
prisoner, or changes to legislation—do not likely threaten state
interests sufficiently.111 Those same issues presumably prevail in
connection with committees for each of the main international
human rights treaties and affect how states view the enforcement
mechanisms associated with treaty ratification.
Table 10: Level 4 Enforcement Mechanism: Committee Visits
Explanatory Variables
Level of Human Rights
Level of Democracy
Level of Economic Development
Difficulty of Ratification Process
Common Law or Not
Transitioning Democracy or Not
Level of Aid
Regional Ratifications
# of Countries
# of Ratifications
# of Observations

Hazard Ratios
CAT Optional Protocol
.732
1.215
.691
.832
1.71
1.443
.008
7.349
135
30
600

**significant at .05; ***significant at .01
7.

CONCLUSION

The quantitative analysis in this study of the relationship
between treaty enforcement mechanisms and the likelihood of
ratification across a broad range of international human rights
treaties provides evidence that state behavior is influenced by
compliance costs—but only where enforcement mechanisms are
strong enough to hold states to their commitments. The statistical
analyses offer evidence that states view international human rights
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat.
I find that states with poor human rights records regularly commit
to international human rights treaties with the weakest
enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, states with poorer
records are less likely to commit to the ICC. The implication is that
where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states take their
commitment to international human rights treaties seriously.
111

Steiner, supra note 31, at 36–37.
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Thus, it may be that states are committing to treaties with weak
enforcement mechanisms in an effort to signal their legitimacy,
without any real intention of bettering their human rights
practices. At least some of those states may conclude that the costs
of commitment are cheap and the consequences of noncompliance
are meager or nonexistent. States may commit to the ICC for other
reasons entirely—because they intend to comply with treaty terms.
After all, should they fail to comply, states face a substantial risk to
their sovereignty—state leaders or citizens can be hauled to The
Hague to stand trial.
The results further indicate that for enforcement mechanisms to
pose a credible threat, they must include a formal grant of power
to engage in legally binding decision-making accompanied by
resources to coerce compliance. The empirical tests indicate that
states do not view any of the enforcement mechanisms in Levels 1
through 4 as a credible threat. In none of those cases is a state’s
level of human rights ratings a consistent, significant, and positive
predictor of ratification, suggesting that states are not overly
concerned with compliance costs where enforcement mechanisms
do not include a grant of power to engage in legally binding
decision-making. Only in the case of the ICC treatyis a state’s level
of human rights practices a significant and positive predictor of
ratification. Only that treaty contains an enforcement mechanism
that allows for legally binding decision-making. States joining the
ICC treaty delegate to an independent Prosecutor and to the Court
the powers to mount investigations, issue arrest warrants,
commence investigations, and punish persons who commit mass
atrocities where the state refuses or is unable to do so domestically.
The evidence suggests that in the case of ICC commitment, states
are concerned about the costs of the compliance and the relative
strength of the ICC treaty’s enforcement mechanisms and engage
in backward-looking calculations about their likelihood of
compliance prior to commitment.
I thus argue that another implication of these statistical
analyses is that treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms
have the best chance of actually influencing and changing states’
human rights behavior for the better. Even if fewer states ratify,
designing treaties so that states focus on the potential for
compliance with treaty terms makes sense since the point of
international human rights treaties is to actually promote better
human rights practices and punish those who abuse human rights.
If states are committing to international human rights treaties
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without regard for their ability to comply—something which this
and other studies112 have shown to occur when enforcement
mechanisms are weak—the prospects for realizing treaty goals are
slim. A brief look at some of the states listed in Table 5 may help
illustrate this point. For example, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia,
Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Russia, Syria, and Turkey are
members of the six main international human rights treaties—some
for decades. Yet, these states all continue to have relatively poor
human rights ratings. My review of the data shows that the 2008
political terror scale rating for all of these states is generally well
below average (on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 being the
worst practices).113 This alone provides some proof that allowing
states—or even encouraging them—to commit to international
human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms
incapable of punishing the bad and noncompliant may not be
sufficient to produce positive change. In fact, some states with bad
records may be using the fact that they ratified these treaties as
something of a shield for their bad behavior: they can point to their
membership in an effort to avoid scrutiny of their actual domestic
practices.114
This study has looked at the role treaty terms can play in states’
ex ante beliefs about the institution and the role that the existence of
apparently stronger enforcement mechanisms can play in
screening states at the ratification stage. Future research should
look at the actual impact of those stronger enforcement
mechanisms and the role they play in improving compliance with
treaty terms. For example, with the ICC treaty and its stronger
enforcement mechanism, researchers can look for evidence that
states have changed their laws to provide for the punishment of
those who commit mass atrocities; evidence that states have
improved their military training and practices so that they do not
112 See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 744–47 (noting that results of
event history analyses concerning state ratification of seven international human
rights treaties—all of which contained only reporting enforcement mechanisms—
showed that “rights-violating governments are more likely to ratify human rights
treaties in a given year, all else being equal.”).
113 The ratings for 2008 are as follows: Egypt (3.5); Ethiopia (3.5); Indonesia
(3.5); Israel (5); Lebanon (3); Libya (3); Morocco (3); Russia (4); Syria (4); and
Turkey (3.5).
114 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 5, at 1374 (observing that while
the average state ratified an increasing percentage of available human rights
treaties, the percentage of states reported to repress human rights has likewise
increased).
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run afoul of the treaty’s war crimes provisions; and evidence that
states are domestically prosecuting crimes otherwise within the
ICC’s jurisdiction so as to avoid any loss of sovereignty.
Future research should also look beyond treaty terms and
examine how the actual functioning of the institutions responsible
for monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with the terms and
goals of international human rights treaties influences state
commitment and compliance. If the institutions in charge of
enforcing compliance are weak or ineffective, we may see that even
where enforcement mechanisms are strong on paper, states will
view the actual enforcement mechanisms as weak and commit
without an intention to comply with treaty terms. On the other
hand, if institutions are effective and if states see that the
institution is effectively punishing noncompliant behavior, states
should have even more reason to view strong enforcement
mechanisms as a credible threat and behave accordingly. Indeed,
if future research does show that states respond to the credible
threat of strong enforcement mechanisms and alter their behavior
so as to comply with those enforcement mechanisms, at least some
international human rights treaties may actually realize their goals
of improving human rights practices and ensuring that those who
do abuse individual human rights are punished.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

01 DUTTON (DO NOT DELETE)

58

1/18/2013 5:10 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:1

APPENDIX A
States Parties to the 14 Different Treaties, Articles, and/or
Protocols
ICCPR (166 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South
Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Article 41 (48 State Parties): Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Gambia,
Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe.
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Optional Protocol (115 State Parties): Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia,
San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Sweden, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago
(denounced 2000), Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia.
ICESCR (160 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal,
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the
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Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
CERD (173 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Antigua, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq , Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait,
Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Article 14 (53 State Parties): Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco,
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San
Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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CEDAW (185 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia,
Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Optional Protocol (98 State Parties): Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua
and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia,
Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France,
Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino,
Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,
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Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.
CAT (147 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,
Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia.
Article 21 (60 State Parties): Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
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Article 22 (64 State Parties): Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Optional Protocol (48 State Parties): Albania, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia,
Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Macedonia,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay.
CRC (193 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan , Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati,
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi
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Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sudan , Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
ICC (111 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador,
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United
Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.
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APPENDIX B
CONTROL VARIABLES DATA DESCRIPTION
Democracy: The democracy indicator is a time-varying
measure coded on a 0 to 10 scale, with scores based on several
dimensions of democracy: (1) competitiveness of political
participation; (2) openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment; and (3) constraints on the chief executive. See Monty
G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project:
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009, CTR. FOR
SYSTEMIC
PEACE
(Apr.
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf.
GDP Per Capita: I obtain the GDP per capita measure for the
“level of economic development” variable from the World Bank
World Development Indicators dataset. I also log the measure to
reduce a skewed distribution. This measure indicates the level of a
state’s wealth and is correlated with its level of industrialization.
This is a time-varying measure that is reported in constant U.S.
dollars.
See Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012).
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty Ratification Process: The
Simmons data used to measure this concept of codes describes
ratification processes using a four-category scale designed to
capture the level of difficulty in the formal domestic ratification
process. The categories are as follows: (1) treaties may be ratified
by an individual chief executive or cabinet; (1.5) there is a rule or
tradition of informing the legislature of signed treaties; (2) treaties
may only be ratified upon consent of one legislative body; (3)
treaties may only be ratified by a supermajority vote in one
legislative body or by a majority vote in two separate legislative
bodies; (4) treaties may be ratified through national plebiscite. The
source and detailed description of this data are available on
Simmons’ website. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS app. 3.2 (2009),
available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/files/APP_
3.2_Ratification_rules.pdf.
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Common Law State or Not: I measure whether a state follows
a common law tradition or not using a dichotomous variable. I
obtained the data for this variable from the Global Network
Growth Database created by William Easterly. See William R.
Easterly, Global Development Network Growth Database, THE WORLD
BANK (June 1, 2001), http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701055
~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#4.
Transitioning Democracy or Not: I use a dichotomous variable
to measure whether a state is a newly transitioning democracy or
not based on the Polity IV democracy variable. Following
Simmons, who used 7 as the number above which she considered
countries to have transitioned to “democracy” in her work testing
state commitment to and compliance with various international
human rights treaties, I code states as a 1 and as new democracies
in a given year if they transitioned from anywhere below a 7 on the
Polity IV scale to a 7 or above. See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 385.
If states were consistently above 7 for the Post-World War II
period, I consider them to be stable democracies and code them 0.
If states are consistently below a 7, I consider them nondemocracies and also code them 0.
Official Development Assistance: I obtain the time-varying
ODA data to measure the idea that states may be pressured to join
international human rights treaties so as to obtain extra-treaty
benefits like aid from the World Bank World Development
Indicators. The data are reported in constant 2007 U.S. dollars as a
share of GDP. See Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012).
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